Introduction
Russia’s approach to the Sahel can be best described as opportunistic. Rather than advancing a coherent regional policy, Moscow has capitalized on its deepening security crises and deteriorating relationships between Sahelian regimes and their Western partners. Over the past decade, the Sahel has been plagued by multidimensional security challenges: a surge in jihadist insurgencies, ethno-nationalist independence movements, and severe resource and climate-based inequalities. These overlapping crises set the stage for a wave of military coups beginning in 2020, ultimately resulting in the establishment of military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. France’s decade-long counterinsurgency mission, Operation Barkhane, further strained relations between Sahelian governments and their Western allies, as it failed to deliver meaningful security improvements. Barkhane’s limited successes made it particularly vulnerable to criticism, a vulnerability Russia quickly exploited. Through its mercenary proxies, Russia offered disillusioned Sahelian regimes an alternative security partnership devoid of democratic or human rights preconditions.
At the core of Russia’s Sahel strategy lies the deployment of quasi-private military companies, most notably the Wagner Group. Wagner’s model promised unconditional security assistance, insulating military elites from domestic opposition and international pressure, while simultaneously advancing Russia’s own interests: resource extraction, political influence, and great power posturing. This approach, however, proved largely exploitative. Far from mitigating violence, Wagner’s operations often intensified conflict dynamics, exacerbating human rights abuses and undermining local governance. Following Wagner’s quasi-dissolution, Russia’s newly formed Africa Corps has assumed a similar role, perpetuating Moscow’s opportunistic engagement in the region.
The Central African Republic (CAR) offers a salient example of Wagner’s operational blueprint and its appeal to African military juntas. In 2018, Russia successfully lobbied the UN Security Council for an arms embargo exemption, allowing it to deploy several hundred Wagner “instructors” to CAR’s capital, Bangui, under the guise of supporting UN peacekeeping operations. This maneuver demonstrated the Kremlin’s ability to advance its interests under a veneer of legitimacy. By 2019, more than a thousand Wagner mercenaries were operating in CAR, exploiting natural resources such as gold, diamonds, and timber.
What set Wagner’s operations in CAR apart was the extent to which it embedded itself within the country’s political, economic, and social structures. Wagner not only infiltrated local markets through force and intimidation but also secured a foothold in President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government, installing a Russian national as his chief security advisor. This dual control—over both the state apparatus and economic resources—provided Wagner with unparalleled leverage. Moreover, Wagner’s relative success in stabilizing the Touadéra regime during a 2021 rebel offensive bolstered its reputation as an effective counterinsurgency force. This perceived success in CAR strengthened Moscow’s appeal across the Sahel, positioning Wagner—and now the Africa Corps—as a viable security partner for fragile military juntas.
Mali: Wagner Stretched to Its Limits
Wagner’s arrival in Mali in 2021 initially appeared to offer the country’s military junta a decisive counterterrorism solution. After a decade of conflict and ineffective Western-backed military operations, Mali’s nascent junta welcomed Wagner’s aggressive, no-strings-attached security assistance. The group’s willingness to deploy alongside the Malian armed forces and employ heavy-handed counterterrorism tactics resonated with military leaders. For a time, Wagner seemed poised to replicate the counterinsurgency model it had established in the CAR.
Yet, Wagner’s operations in Mali quickly revealed the limitations of its approach. Far from restoring stability, violence has soared since the group’s arrival over three years ago. Between August 2023 and August 2024, analysts noted an “81 percent increase in violence involving Russian mercenaries … and a 65 percent increase in reported fatalities.” Any temporary gains have proven fleeting. For instance, the reclamation of Kidal, a longstanding rebel stronghold, in November 2023 did little to stem insecurity. Less than a year later, coordinated jihadist attacks targeted Mali’s capital, Bamako, the first major attack on the city in nearly a decade. Moreover, Wagner’s track record of human rights atrocities, such as extrajudicial killings and mass executions, has alienated local populations and compounded instability. Paradoxically, this enduring chaos benefits Russia, as it keeps Mali’s demand for Wagner’s security assistance high.
Wagner’s 2024 counterinsurgency expansion in Mali further exposed the fragility of its operations. In July 2024, the group suffered its most devastating military defeat in Africa when Tuareg separatists and al-Qaeda militants ambushed a joint Malian-Wagner convoy in northern Mali. The ambush resulted in staggering casualties for Wagner, marking one of its deadliest battles outside of Ukraine. This incident not only shattered the group’s image as an effective counterinsurgency force but also underscored the precariousness of Russia’s security model in the region.
Despite these setbacks, Wagner’s broader role in Africa remains critical to Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. Its rapid rise to prominence—and subsequent failures—reflect Russia’s broader push for influence on the continent. Although Wagner’s brand has undoubtedly suffered, particularly after the death of its leader and financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, Moscow has moved swiftly to preserve its presence in Africa. The Kremlin’s establishment of the Africa Corps signals Russia’s commitment to maintaining influence in Mali and beyond, despite the mounting costs of Wagner’s failures.
Challenges Facing the Africa Corps
Wagner’s defeat in Mali is only one facet of the broader challenges facing Russia in the Sahel. Despite the Kremlin’s push to consolidate operations under the Africa Corps, full integration remains elusive. Wagner’s battlefield failures in Mali have accelerated this transition, but the process has been marred by recruiting shortfalls and waning operational capacity. In Mali, Africa Corps has struggled to attract new personnel, often resorting to Wagner’s brand recognition to bolster recruitment. However, discontent among Malian officers—some of whom have expressed a preference for “more professional and disciplined partners”—underscores the growing strain in Russia’s security partnerships. These internal fractures cast doubt on the long-term viability of Africa Corps as a credible counterterrorism force.
The situation is even more precarious in Burkina Faso and Niger, where Africa Corps’ presence remains insufficient to combat the region’s worsening jihadist threat. Militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS have intensified attacks, pushing further south and east from Mali. In response, Africa Corps has sought to position itself as the primary security partner for the nascent Alliance of Sahel States, a military coalition formed by Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali following their respective coups. Yet, like Wagner before it, Africa Corps is already enabling and emboldening Sahelian militaries with a documented history of mass human rights violations, including the summary execution of hundreds of civilians. Russia’s reliance on brutal counterterrorism tactics, devoid of any meaningful development or governance support, has only deepened local grievance, a dynamic that directly fuels jihadist recruitment.
The Kremlin’s ability to maintain influence through the Africa Corps is further constrained by external pressures. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to divert critical military resources. Meanwhile, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria—a key logistical hub for Wagner’s African operations—has raised concerns about the disruption of supply lines. This potential resource strain risks diminishing Russia’s capacity to sustain Africa Corps at full operational strength. In turn, African clients may soon grow disillusioned with Moscow’s inability to deliver reliable security assistance.
In light of these fears, Moscow has attempted to reassure its Sahelian partners of its long-term commitment. In November 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, speaking on behalf of Vladimir Putin, vowed Russia’s “total support to our African friends” in their fight against terrorism and pursuit of economic development. Yet these promises remain hollow. Russia’s limited economic investments in the region, coupled with its sole focus on security cooperation, highlight the superficial nature of its engagement.
This creates a strategic opening for the United States, if Washington is willing to seize it. Historically, the United States has possessed a comparative advantage in the region through its capacity to deploy a whole-of-government approach, combining security assistance with long-term investments in governance, infrastructure, and economic development. However, recent US policy shifts have raised doubts about Washington’s future role in the Sahel. The Trump administration’s foreign aid freeze, coupled with rumors of downgrading US Africa Command to a subcommand under US European Command, suggests a diminishing US footprint.
Staying in the Game: US Approaches to Sahel Security in 2025
While the United States maintains a strategic advantage over Russia in the Sahel, its policy options remain constrained by self-imposed limitations. The US decision to pause and re-evaluate foreign aid is likely to have broad consequences both for the Sahel and the broader African continent. Even if Washington were to recalibrate its approach, Section 7008 coup-related sanctions continue to restrict traditional security assistance to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where military juntas have consolidated power and resisted a return to civilian rule. Without political reforms from these regimes—and absent a shift in US policy—insecurity in the Sahel will persist and increasingly threaten neighboring states.
While full disengagement from military regimes in the Sahel risks further ceding influence to rival powers like Russia, direct engagement appears to contradict US commitments to democratic governance. Yet, analysts warn that prolonged disengagement only deepens the governance vacuum, allowing Russia and its Africa Corps to entrench their influence. To navigate this dilemma, Washington should consider adopting an approach that combines humanitarian assistance with strategic engagement aimed at fostering dialogue and civil-military relations training. By extending outreach to both military officers and civil society actors, the United States could position itself as a pragmatic security partner while promoting long-term democratic norms. As military regimes inevitably face internal and external pressures to relinquish power, despite the juntas’ efforts at resource nationalism, early engagement could position the United States as the preferred partner for any subsequent, more cooperative regime.
Beyond the Sahel’s military regimes, the United States must also strengthen security partnerships with the region’ southern neighbors, including Ghana, Benin, Togo, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire, which are increasingly vulnerable to jihadist spillover. Extremist groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS have steadily expanded south from Mali, exploiting porous borders and weak state capacity. Bolstering border security, providing counterterrorism assistance, and investing in early-warning systems for these southern states are critical to preventing jihadist entrenchment. While these threats may appear geographically distant, the January 2025 Islamic State-inspired attack in New Orleans demonstrates the global nature of jihadism networks and the potential for local conflicts to produce international repercussions. Ignoring the security deterioration in the Sahel risks allowing jihadist groups to consolidate power, not only destabilizing Africa but also posing long-term security risks to the United States and European partners.
However, focusing solely on security sector reform or military assistance is strategically short-sighted. Stabilizing the Sahel requires addressing the underlying drivers of insecurity—economic inequality, poor governance, and systemic underdevelopment—that extremist groups exploit. Therefore, in order to build lasting stability, the United States must supplement its security assistance with long-term investments in governance, infrastructure, and economic development.
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Christopher M. Faulkner, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the College of Distance Education at the US Naval War College and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow with the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His research focuses on militant recruitment, private military companies, and civil-military relations. He has published extensively in leading international security and relations journals and has contributed to outlets such as War on the Rocks, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, and Lawfare, among others. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Naval War College, US Navy, Department of Defense, or the US Government.
Raphael Parens is a 2024-2025 Templeton Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. He is an international security researcher specializing in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, with a particular focus on small armed groups, Russian foreign policy, and security issues in sub-Saharan Africa. The views expressed in this article are his own.
Image Credit: Информационное агентство БелТА, CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons
