Introduction
Türkiye has just lived through the very essence of Lenin’s famous words: “There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” The week of May 12-18, 2025, marked a historic turning point for Türkiye and its surrounding region—one defined by extraordinary diplomatic activity, seismic political shifts, and the possibility of a lasting transformation in Kurdish politics.
In Syria, the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 gave way to continued uncertainty about the new government under Ahmed Al Shara. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump, visiting Saudi Arabia on May 13, announced the lifting of sanctions following a phone call with President Erdoğan. Just days later, Istanbul hosted high-stakes peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in attendance. The next day, European and Iranian negotiators convened to revisit the terms of the nuclear deal. On May 25, Ahmed Al-Shara visited Istanbul to meet with U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, who announced what he called “a new chapter” in U.S.-Middle East relations.
Yet perhaps the most consequential development came on May 12, when the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) officially declared disarmament, signaling the potential end of a decades-long armed conflict. This announcement marks a turning point not just for Türkiye’s internal politics, but for the broader region’s future.
At the center of these dramatic shifts stands Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Turkish Nationalist Party (MHP). Known for steering Türkiye’s political direction through key interventions, Bahçeli’s 2002 call for early elections paved the way for the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). His more recent actions, particularly his 2023 appeal for imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to facilitate the group’s dissolution, now appear equally transformative. Behind the scenes, influential spymaster İbrahim Kalın, once a Georgetown University professor and now a key figure in Turkish statecraft, worked closely with President Erdoğan to bring these changes into focus.
The past week has redrawn Türkiye’s political map and may redefine its global role. Most notably, Kurdish politics is shifting from armed struggle to democratic participation. As the PKK lays down arms and Kurdish movements seek legitimacy through the ballot box, Türkiye faces a historic chance to move beyond zero-sum conflict. A renewed peace process rooted in dialogue and pluralism offers the best path forward. This essay traces the Kurdish question’s history, examines recent shifts, and argues that only a constitutional and symbolic reimagining of coexistence can secure lasting peace.
Historical Coherence Through Contradiction
The tension between the Turkish state and the Kurds is not a recent development but part of a historical continuum that dates back to the Ottoman Empire. Its roots can be traced to Sultan Mahmud II’s 19th-century centralization reforms, which aimed to dismantle the semi-autonomous Kurdish mirs (principalities). These efforts marked the beginning of a slow erosion of Kurdish autonomy under the guise of imperial modernization.
By the early 20th century, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of modern nation-states fundamentally reshaped the conflict. What had once been a negotiation over local governance became a struggle between top-down state-building and the preservation of Kurdish identity. Yet even then, early Kurdish nationalist movements did not initially seek to break away from the state. Rather, they aspired to participate in shaping it.
This nuance is often overlooked. For instance, Turkish nationalist Hamdullah Suphi welcomed Hevi, the first Kurdish nationalist student organization, into Türk Ocakları, the Turkish nationalist association, allowing it to hold meetings there. Far from being contradictory, this cooperation reflected a broader ideal at the time: Muslim solidarity as a unifying force that could bind diverse ethnic groups together under a shared Ottoman identity. It was this spirit of solidarity that inspired many Kurds to support the Turkish War of Independence, motivated by a belief in a common destiny.
The real rupture emerged not with the end of the empire, but with the rise of the nation-state. As British and French mandates carved up the former Ottoman lands, Kurdish communities found themselves divided across new borders and subjected to competing state ideologies. In Türkiye, the newly formed Kemalist regime adopted a nationalist model that aimed to eliminate ethnic distinctions in favor of a singular Turkish identity.
This historical context casts new light on the PKK’s 2025 disarmament announcement. Rather than a simple cessation of hostilities, it can be read as a rejection of rigid nationalist paradigms, particularly the assimilationist tendencies of Kemalism, and a renewed call for Turkish-Kurdish fraternity. In doing so, the movement echoes the earlier spirit of shared resistance and inclusive state-building that briefly animated the post-Ottoman moment.
“The Health of the State Is Our Health”: Rethinking Coexistence in a New Era
Abdurrahman Bedirhan, the publisher of the first Kurdish newspaper Kurdistan, epitomizes the paradoxes at the heart of Kurdish-Turkish relations. His words capture this duality: warning Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II, “If you do not listen to us, you will listen to our guns,” yet also declaring, “The health of the state is our health, and the demise of the state is our demise.” Bedirhan’s later appointment as governor of Aydın and his service during World War I underscore the long, complex entanglement of Kurdish identity with the machinery of the Turkish state. Kurdish and Turkish destinies have always been interwoven—not just in conflict, but in uneasy coexistence.
This duality persists. Founded by Öcalan in the 1970s, the PKK emerged as a Kurdish socialist response to the foundational ideology of the Turkish Republic: the Kemalist model of a unitary, nationalist state. However, under President Erdoğan’s rule, Öcalan has reoriented the movement toward political integration. In 2002, from prison, he called on the PKK to adopt a democratic federation model, effectively renouncing the goal of full independence. The organization convened a congress and revised its platform accordingly. Though incarcerated since 1999, Öcalan has remained an active ideological force—neither a detached Hegelian world-historical figure nor simply a symbolic prisoner, but someone bound by history’s constraints and still shaping its course.
This shift reflects a deeper dialectic in Kurdish political life: one that oscillates between rebellion and integration, rupture and reconciliation. From Hevi’s student meetings at Türk Ocakları to Bedirhan’s work in Ottoman administration, Kurdish actors have long navigated the space between resistance and cooperation. Today’s unexpected but consequential dialogue between Devlet Bahçeli and Abdullah Öcalan follows this same historical pattern, proving that the boundaries between Turkish nationalism and Kurdish autonomy have never been as fixed as they seem. In recent statements, Öcalan himself evoked “more than one thousand years” of shared Turkish-Kurdish history, calling for the reconstruction of a fragile relationship “in the spirit of fraternity.”
The real challenge, then, is not to erase these contradictions, but to recognize them as the foundation for a new political settlement. As Leo Tolstoy suggests in War and Peace, conflict and reconciliation are not opposites but part of a single, evolving historical current. Kurdish politics today cannot be reduced to armed struggle or framed exclusively by terrorism. Nor can peace be achieved solely through state suppression. Instead, both sides are engaged in a complex, strategic recalibration: Türkiye seeks to eliminate terrorism from the political sphere, while Kurdish movements increasingly aim for legitimacy and democratic inclusion. At times, their interests converge.
The PKK’s decision to disarm—prompted by Bahçeli’s initiative and legitimized by Öcalan’s intervention—was unimaginable even a decade ago. The planned congress in Malazgirt is especially symbolic. Long known as the site of the Seljuk Turks’ 1071 victory and entry into Anatolia, Malazgirt is now being reimagined as a site of Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation. This reinterpretation aims to transform a nationalist symbol into a shared one—an emblem of a thousand years of shared history and the possibilities for future harmony.
Beyond War: Kurdish Politics at a Crossroads
The Kurdish issue extends beyond Türkiye’s borders, serving as a geopolitical flashpoint deeply embedded in regional and global power struggles. During the fight against ISIS, the PKK and its Syrian affiliates—the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and People’s Defense Units (YPG)—formed strategic partnerships with the United States and other Western powers while managing a delicate balance with Russia and the Assad regime. These alliances reshaped regional dynamics and heightened Türkiye’s geopolitical concerns.
In the aftermath of the Syrian revolution, these complexities have only intensified. Türkiye faces the looming uncertainties in a post-Assad order, ongoing tensions with Iran, and a need to recalibrate relations with Israel, all while maintaining uneasy yet essential alliances with Washington and Moscow. This precarious balancing act underscores the multifaceted nature of the Kurdish question and highlights Öcalan’s continued relevance in PKK disarmament.
Domestically, Kurdish political parties have grown increasingly influential. They hold parliamentary seats and have emerged as key players in presidential elections—evident in Erdoğan’s engagement with the conservative Kurdish party Hudapar and opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s outreach to the leftist Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party. Support from major parties, including the AKP, MHP, DEM, and CHP, represents nearly 90 percent of the electorate. This strategic realignment signals a potential path toward de-escalating long-standing tensions, highlighting Kurdish agency in shaping Turkish democracy.
Still, a deeper dilemma remains. Lasting peace depends not on the absence of conflict but on managing opposing forces. History shows war and peace coexist and require ongoing care to prevent collapse into violence.
The centuries-long Safavid-Ottoman conflict across Kurdish-inhabited lands offers a precedent. Despite ideological, religious, and geopolitical rivalries, these powers reached a durable understanding formalized in the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab. Crucially, both managed Kurdish populations through pragmatic accommodations.
This lesson resonates today. As imprisoned Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş notes, the social and economic integration of Turks and Kurds is irreversible. He asserts, “A new Turkish-Kurdish alliance will take shape … No Kurd will any longer be an opponent, enemy, or threat to their own state or to Türkiye.”
Acknowledging this interdependence, Türkiye faces a new political phase requiring a reimagined national foundation. A new constitution must embrace Kurds as integral to the republic while recalibrating Türkiye’s regional posture beyond past Kurdish policy frameworks.
Though a clear peace roadmap remains elusive—unlike prior transparent efforts—a broad consensus is emerging. Central to this is repositioning Öcalan, no longer solely as a terrorist but as essential to any lasting resolution. His involvement would enable a legally grounded PKK disarmament declaration that addresses members’ legal status.
Equally important is reconstructing national memory. A renewed peace process must integrate Turkish and Kurdish narratives, moving beyond exclusionary state models. The reframing of Malazgirt, by Bahçeli, from a moment of Turkish military triumph in 1071 to a shared starting point for Turkish-Kurdish solidarity, could become a powerful emblem of this shared history.
Finally, lasting peace requires a genuine transformation of the Turkish state. For the first time, constitutional reform must be civilian-led and free from military legacy, addressing contentious issues such as Kurdish language education and being inclusive to the ethno-religious diversity of the country. Meeting these conditions could allow Türkiye to move beyond war toward a more inclusive, terror-free future.
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Selçuk Aydın holds a PhD from King’s College in the School of Security Studies. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters, and opinions on Turkey’s history, the Turkish diaspora, Kurdish studies, and Middle East politics. He is currently an assistant professor at Boğaziçi University and a post-doctoral researcher at Shanghai University.
Image Credit: Leticia Barr, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0, via Flickr
