Introduction
China has significantly bolstered its economic and military capabilities in the last twenty years by expanding ambitious projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI). The GSI is considered a blueprint of China’s foreign policy and seeks to “eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era, and promote durable peace and development in the world.” The GSI further intends to expand China’s role in international politics and challenge the Western-led global governance system. The document also advocates for a lasting peace and stability in the Middle East and seeks to strengthen relations with regional organizations.
China aims to transform into a power capable of exerting extraterritorial influence. Since 2013, with the announcement of the BRI, China has expanded on its “Going Out” policy and increased its presence in other regions through investments and soft power initiatives. Although the Asia-Pacific region has been the focal point of US-China competition, China has also identified the Middle East as an arena to assert its presence as a great power. However, in contrast to the US presence in the region which has focused on military and defense, China has focused on economic initiatives and political involvement exercised through conflict management and diplomatic mediations.
China has formulated its presence in the Middle East in the last decade to offer an alternative to the United States. Highlighting that US actions have undermined regional unity and capabilities, China has adopted a comparatively indirect approach. China has reinforced regional efforts and maintained a positive image amid worsening local perceptions of the West as seen in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. Having adopted a neutral stance and a strictly diplomatic presence, China has avoided imposing punitive measures, such as sanctions and exclusionary measures, instead opting for dialogue and mediation efforts. The Gaza war is a major test for China to gain recognition from the Arab governments for its actorness in the region. Overall, China has maintained a supportive rhetorical stance without offering a clear resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. China has urged its citizens in Israel and Lebanon to evacuate, condemned Israeli airstrikes, and reaffirmed support for Lebanese sovereignty. This reflects China’s Middle East strategy of avoiding direct involvement, seeking to maintain its positive image in the region while leaving security responsibilities to the United States.
China Expanding its Regional Presence by Mediating Hamas-Israeli Negotiations
Building on the momentum of the 2023 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, China has demonstrated initiative toward mediating recent conflicts in the region. Amidst the conflict between Israel and Palestine since October 7, 2023, Beijing has tried to uphold a delicate balance between preserving its economic ties with Israel and advocating for the Palestinian cause. China has promoted de-escalation efforts and long-term peace, emphasizing the importance of a two-state solution, and expressed a commitment to supporting peace negotiations, often through international conferences. From the outset of the conflict, China has presented a five-point proposal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to establish a comprehensive ceasefire to end the fighting, protect civilians, ensure humanitarian assistance, and reach a diplomatic settlement. To uphold its image as a responsible and peaceful rising power in the international system, China has not condemned specific actors but has instead opposed all acts that harm civilians and violate international law.
China’s diplomatic support has also materialized in its organization of other states in seeking a long-term resolution to the conflict. During the tenth ministerial conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, China called for a “China-Arab community with a shared future in the new era.” On the Palestine issue, Xi Jinping reaffirmed that China firmly supports the establishment of an independent state of Palestine based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital and full membership in the UN. A collective statement by China and Arab States on the Palestine issue with a timeframe for 2024-2026 demonstrates that regional states welcome China’s actorness in the Middle East. UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan noted that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, both sides will continue “work to enhance Arab-Chinese cooperation and efforts in the near future.” The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs commented that his country appreciated China’s positions in continuous support of stopping the war in Gaza.
China’s most substantial engagement in resolving the conflict came with The Beijing Declaration, a deal brokering unity between Hamas, Fatah, and twelve other factions operating in Palestine. This initiative put forward China’s three-step initiative regarding the ongoing Gaza conflict and further indicated the country’s diplomatic ambitions given that it was promoted as comparable to the deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, the deep historical divide between Hamas and Fatah has impeded the materialization of the goals set; China’s [diplomatic] credibility also lacks the military support to reinforce the deal materially. China’s inability to initiate negotiations between Israel and Hamas and the United States still leading any plans for ceasefire showcases China’s still limited conflict management role in the region. However, China’s involvement extends beyond the Israel-Palestine conflict.
China Diffusing Tensions Between Iran and Israel
Following Israel’s attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria and Iran’s subsequent retaliation, China assumed a significant role in the conflict. In response to the escalating tensions between Israel and Iran, Beijing expressed a relatively pro-Iran stance, asserting that Tehran had not instigated regional instability. Addressing the Iranian attack at the UNSC, Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative Dai Bing reiterated China’s official stance by denouncing the Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate as a severe violation of international norms and sovereignty. On April 14, 2024, shortly after Iran’s retaliation, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a concise statement urging all involved parties to act with restraint to prevent further escalation. This diplomatic approach aligns with China’s customary practice of condemning actions rather than assigning blame, emphasizing dialogue and non-alignment in the process.
In the same vein, but with a more assertive tone, China condemned Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July 2024 in Tehran, raising concerns that “this incident may lead to further instability in the region.” The condemnation further stated that “China always stands for resolving regional disputes through negotiations and dialogue.” China has actively worked to strengthen its relationships with Arab nations in the Persian Gulf; this position was evident in the land dispute between the UAE and Iran in the Gulf where Beijing expressed support for the UAE.
Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States was the primary external power overseeing the region; however, its overstretch in Iraq, minimalist approach in dealing with the Syrian conflict, response to the Qatar crisis, unilateral withdrawal from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan all shape perceptions of US retrenchment from the region. Meanwhile, US interests and military bases in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria face constant threats from resistance groups. Increasingly, Arab states (especially Saudi Arabia) and China have jointly produced weapons. China emerging as a top arms supplier for many Middle Eastern countries and Chinese bilateral military drills such as that with the UAE challenge US military dominance in the region. Economically, the United States has also experienced a decline in its influence in the region, as its aid policies have failed to stabilize the Middle East. US foreign direct investment (FDI), although higher than in the 2000s, has remained at the same levels over the past six years. The Middle East also lags behind other regions in receiving US FDI. Moreover, Arab public opinion of the United States has worsened, which makes US soft power in the region ineffective in supporting a ceasefire. Thus, US decline in the region is less about its capabilities than about its policy choices leading to poor outcomes.
Policy Implications for the United States
Western countries have long ignored the impact of China’s diplomatic influence in the Global South and insist on declaring China a threat despite other countries having positive experiences in their relations with China. China’s presence in the Middle East, although starting from trade links, has grown significantly over the last ten years in multiple domains. Beijing has sought to tarnish the United States’ image in the Gulf and forge closer relations with both Arab countries and Iran. Along with its anti-imperialist and anti-colonial approach, China has managed to separate itself from Western Powers, namely the United States, and has positioned itself as a better alternative. Although Arab states still rely on the United States for security commitments, dissatisfaction against Washington is growing. Thus, as China improves its relations and tightens its ties to the regional states, it will become harder for the United States to assert dominance in the Middle East.
In response to China’s initiative, both the United States and European Union should re-engage with the Middle East by holding multilateral summits with Arab states. The United States should promote a lasting peace proposal to ensure regional stability. Given Iran’s power in the region, this proposal would require reopening channels of communication with Iran. In short, the United States must demonstrate its commitment to resolve conflicts and improve relations between Arab states and Israel post-war. The United States should also seek to extend the Abraham Accords bilaterally between Israel and other states and multilaterally with the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Moreover, the United States needs to tone down the threat narrative of China in the Middle East because most of the Middle East has neither territorial disputes nor previous hostile incidents with China. As such, the United States should not condemn projects developed by China but rather seek assurances from its partners in the Middle East that they do not jeopardize national security. The United States should focus on strengthening its own presence in the region by investing in joint infrastructure projects–especially in technology–which is a high priority for many countries in the Middle East. The United States can also reassert its presence in the region by developing a free trade agreement that also includes other Western states. US-Middle East trade approach could boost economic ties, particularly in Gulf renewable energy projects, with all sides. Additionally, information exchange on digital security and privacy issues between the EU and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) could alleviate the Gulf states’ security and user privacy concerns. Enhanced port security based on information sharing could further secure trade routes for all sides.
Conclusion
China’s mediation efforts in the Middle East have boosted its prestige as a peace-promoting actor while advancing its economic and strategic interests, challenging the traditional roles of the United States and Europe in the region. Although it has avoided direct involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, China has deepened ties with Arab states to capitalize on dissatisfaction with the US response to the war, eyeing diplomatic and economic expansion. To counter China’s influence, the United States must enhance multilateral engagement, invest in infrastructure in the Middle East, and offer better alternatives to Chinese initiatives.
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Maria Papageorgiou is a Leverhulme Early Career Researcher at Newcastle University in the UK. Before that, she taught at the University of Exeter, UCL, and SOAS University of London. Her areas of expertise include China as a great power, its engagement in the Middle East, and Sino-Russian relations.
Mohammad Eslami is an Invited Assistant Professor of International Relations and an Integrated Member of the Research Centre for Political Science (CICP) at the University of Minho, Portugal. His expertise focuses on Middle Eastern studies, Iran’s foreign policy, states’ military capabilities, and Sino-Iranian relations.
Image Credit: zeev stein Pikiwiki Israel, CC BY 2.5, via Wikimedia Commons.
