Venezuelan Migration: Past, Present, and Future

Introduction

Venezuela has become one of the largest sources of international migrants worldwide. An estimated 7.9 million Venezuelans live abroad today, 85 percent of whom reside in neighboring Latin American and Caribbean countries. The outpouring of migrants from Venezuela began over 10 years ago, and Venezuelans continue to leave at much higher rates than they return. This pattern has persisted, signaling that Venezuelans’ international movement is generally long-term migration rather than temporary migration. Long-term migration, according to the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, refers to a person’s relocation to a new place for one year or longer. As of this writing, Venezuelan migration could become permanent, following the pattern of other international examples, as the potential for return in the aftermath of President Nicolás Maduro’s capture remains highly uncertain. Therefore, the long-term nature of Venezuelan migration means that receiving states must pivot away from emergency response policies and toward incorporation policies suited for the long-term migration reality.

Key Factors Shaping Venezuelan Migration

As elsewhere, the perceived costs versus the perceived benefits of departure heavily shape Venezuelan migration. This calculus shifts in response to evolving conditions in prominent Venezuelan migration routes and anticipated destinations. For instance, for employed Venezuelans, job loss presents a cost of departing. However, for those who have already lost their jobs as unemployment levels have risen, this is not the case. Likewise, the cost of foregoing assets has lessened as skyrocketing inflation devalues cars, land, and homes. Because so many people have migrated over the last decade, Venezuelans considering leaving the country today have fewer loved ones to worry about leaving behind. Meanwhile, ongoing concerns about safety, consumption, political expression, and now armed conflict continue to add to the perceived benefits of leaving Venezuela for those who still remain.

When, where, and how Venezuelans can migrate—all of which are related to an individual’s economic and social capital—also shape migration patterns. Entering a foreign country by airplane is not only the most expensive option but also typically requires a passport. Attempts to acquire or renew a passport in Venezuela, however, can take years, and, in the aftermath of the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, the passports of vocal journalists and political dissidents were inexplicably canceled. Moreover, in the years leading up to the latest presidential election and since, various receiving countries have imposed strict entry visa requirements for Venezuelans, making authorized entry out of reach for most. While non-air travel is comparatively more clandestine and less expensive, traveling by land and sea is notoriously more dangerous. Nevertheless, the number of Venezuelans traversing the Darien Gap rose dramatically between 2014 and 2024, signaling that, despite the inherent risks, migrating along insecure routes seemed to many like a better option than staying in Venezuela.

Venezuelans continue to migrate and reside abroad in the long term despite the dangers of land and boat travel, the threat of downward economic mobility, and growing xenophobia and sociopolitical hostility. The present conditions in Venezuela remain unsustainable for many and increasingly volatile for most, leading people to migrate internationally despite the potential perils in the hope for increased safety and health.

Policy Responses to Venezuelan Migration

Venezuelan migrants have encountered a wide and dynamic range of policies across the Western Hemisphere. Although most Latin American countries signed on to the Quito Process in 2018—a nonbinding regional initiative intended to harmonize policies and unify government responses to Venezuelan migration—many countries adopted their own individualized deterrence policies as the growth of their Venezuelan migrant population strained public institutions and immigration systems. Between 2015 and 2019, for instance, prominent receiving countries like Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago introduced new policies requiring Venezuelans to obtain visas prior to arrival. Many of these countries also began to require passports to formally enter by 2019. Several of them, like Ecuador and Panama, refused to accept expired passports. Others, such as Chile and Peru, however, were still willing to accept expired passports in keeping with the Quito Process.

As Venezuelans continued to arrive undeterred and migrant populations continued to grow, many countries that adopted migration-deterrence policies also developed programs to temporarily regularize the immigration status of already-arrived Venezuelans, thereby reducing the size of their undocumented populations. Ecuador and Peru, for example, started offering Venezuelans a temporary protected status in 2017. Chile and the United States followed suit in 2021. These programs entitled Venezuelans to various benefits and services but were designed to last only a matter of years. The programs’ temporary nature, in turn, undermined migrants’ employment prospects and socioeconomic stability, as well as their ability to plan for their and their families’ futures. Moreover, under mounting national political pressure, both Ecuador and Peru abruptly revoked their temporary visa programs, while the United States revoked temporary protected status for Venezuelans and began limiting their entry in 2025. In 2024, Ecuador reintroduced a similar visa protection program as before, though policy instability toward Venezuelans erodes the trust of migrants, employers, and local communities, potentially leading to further instability over time.

Venezuela’s immediate neighbors have followed a different and seemingly more stable policy trajectory. As of 2026, roughly ten years into the humanitarian situation, neighbors Brazil and Colombia still do not require visas or valid passports. Although Guyana long had visa and passport policies in place, as of 2019, Guyanese migration officials were instructed not to enforce them. These neighboring countries have been among the most feasible countries of reception for families migrating with children or without the socioeconomic means to anticipatorily acquire visas.

Benefits of Promoting Long-Term Incorporation

As of 2024, 89 percent and 69 percent of Venezuelans surveyed in Colombia and Peru, respectively, reported that it was “very likely” they would stay for at least the next year. Recognizing the long-term rather than temporary nature of Venezuelan migration today, it is in the best interest of receiving countries to plan accordingly. Venezuela has high literacy rates, and until recently, its education system was ranked among the best in Latin America. Thus, despite growing xenophobic rhetoric and mounting anti-immigrant sentiment in the Western hemisphere, the reality is that Venezuelan migration represents an inflow of individuals with considerable human capital.

Promoting long-term incorporation means embracing what Venezuelans individually and collectively have to offer and developing policies to comprehensively reduce barriers to legal permanent residence; access to formal labor markets, schools, and healthcare; and family reunification. Policies like these not only benefit Venezuelan migrants but also countries of reception and their citizens. Migrants’ access to public healthcare, for example, increases the prevention of communicable disease transmission, thereby safeguarding citizens’ health. As demonstrated in the United States, migrants’ access to the formal labor market can lead to innovation, help fill labor shortages in select sectors, and expand the local economy. Meanwhile, creating pathways to citizenship or long-term residency allows migrants to plan for their future, increasing their willingness and ability to invest financially in the countries to which they relocate.

Even if migrants increase demand or competition for services in countries of reception, strategic policies can help offset potential strain. Professional licensure policies offer a case in point. While healthcare demand may increase if migrants are granted free or low-cost access, healthcare supply will also rise if migrant nurses and physicians’ professional licenses are legally recognized. Likewise, while the demand for schooling may rise if migrant children enroll, the supply of teachers can expand if migrant teachers are allowed to use their professional accreditation obtained in Venezuela.

Toward Promoting Long-Term Incorporation

Only a handful of countries have offered Venezuelans pathways to legal permanent residence, but through Southern Common Market, or Mercosur, programs such as the Agreement on Residence for Citizens of Mercosur and Associated States (RAM), other states can follow suit. Colombia, for instance, offers a ten-year residence permit to Venezuelans that enables access to the labor market, healthcare, and education system, and creates a pathway to permanent residency after the ten-year period. Similarly, through Mercosur, Venezuelans can obtain two-year visas in Argentina that engender access to education, healthcare, and the labor market and create a pathway to permanent residency after two years. Argentina made it easier for Venezuelans to access Mercosur in 2024 by easing certain passport and apostille document certification requirements.

Policies of countries like Colombia and Argentina exemplify approaches suited to the reality of long-term Venezuelan migration. Although political resistance may initially impede inclusive long-term policies, a stable and well-incorporated migrant population will, in the long run, enhance public health, grow local economies, lead to more accurate assessments of institutional and infrastructural needs, and improve migrant, employer, and community trust.

In fact, comprehensive mechanisms already exist in response to Venezuelan migration in many Latin American countries. Like Argentina, for example, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are members of Mercosur, while six additional countries, including neighboring Guyana, are associate members. Countries like these could follow in Argentina’s footsteps, leveraging RAM as a stepping stone toward legal permanent residence. RAM emerged in the early 2000s to promote economic expansion. Although Mercosur suspended Venezuela’s membership in 2017, the suspension decision stipulated that Venezuelan nationals must not be collaterally harmed. Argentina and Uruguay continued to offer Venezuelans RAM coverage in light of this language, whereas most other member states called for alternative mechanisms in response to “crisis” migration. The continued existence of RAM, and Argentina and Uruguay’s interpretation of its coverage for Venezuelans, however, provides an important blueprint for other Mercosur members. Currently, other members’ ad hoc policies neither deter nor incorporate Venezuelan migrants, a consequence that is unsustainable in the long term.

Conclusion

There is no indication that the political, economic, and social crises that have compelled nearly one in four people to leave Venezuela will subside soon. As of January 2026, uncertainty has increased significantly. Considering that Venezuelans’ international migration has become demonstrably long-term, countries with sizable and emergent Venezuelan populations should develop stable, hospitable policies to bring them out of the shadows and promote their economic and social integration. To that effect, the policies of countries like Colombia and Argentina provide pathways toward permanent legal residency for Venezuelan migrants. In the long run, such policies will not only benefit Venezuelan migrants but also native citizens, and they should be replicated elsewhere.

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Abigail Weitzman is Associate Professor of Sociology and a research affiliate of the Population Research Center and the Lozano Long Institute for Latin American Studies at the University of Texas. Her work asks how expectations, desires, and threats influence the timing and nature of important events in people’s lives, cumulatively shaping demographic patterns; and, reciprocally, how shifting social circumstances influence aspirations, perceived threats, and behaviors in ways that shape individuals’ life trajectories.

Cecilia Menjívar is Distinguished Professor and the Dorothy L. Meier Social Equities Chair in the Department of Sociology and the Director of the Center for the Study of International Migration at the University of California, Los Angeles. In her scholarship, she examines the structural underpinnings of inequality and how individuals’ social locations shape their responses to those conditions.

This research was made possible with support from the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development (K01HD099313; P2CHD042849). The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.

Image Credit: gailhampshire from Cradley, Malvern, U.K, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons