Latin America Amid Trump’s Hemispheric Dominance

Background

Ideological in nature, US-Soviet tensions during the Cold War served as a unifying driver within US foreign policy. All aspects of foreign policy thereof were seen through the lens of an existential ideological contest. With the demise of the Soviet Union, that unifying influence disappeared. US foreign policy consequently became dispersed, and Washington was forced to involve itself in a broader and more diverse assortment of geopolitical scenarios at the same time to maintain its standing as a global player, increasing its risk of conflicting priorities.

 Aggravating this issue, the exchange of power between Republicans and Democrats often marked a shift in these priorities, such that the lack of a strategic compass seemed to prevail. Indeed, the only foreign policy topic that a domestically fractured United States has been able to agree on these last few years has been China. However, this never translated into a structured and bipartisan strategy toward the country.

Grand Strategy

Curiously enough, given the transactional and personalistic nature of Trump’s foreign policy, for the first time in decades the United States seems to be following a sort of grand strategy. To this end, it has joined both Russia and China in the revisionist purpose of destroying the International Liberal Order that prevailed during the last eight decades, while giving shape to a distribution of spheres of influence. Within this distribution, as stated by the administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy and 2026 National Defense Strategy, the United States turns its attention toward its own hemisphere. As a result, it not only asserts its “rights” to hemispheric dominance under the Monroe Doctrine, but also construes a neo-imperial corollary to it.

At least this seemed to be the agenda until Trump jumped into the Middle East, initiating war of choice against Iran. Does this mean that US foreign policy is bound to disperse itself again, losing direction amid conflicting priorities? Probably not. Trump’s miscalculation has put a burning potato in his hand that he wants to get rid of. If anything, this experience has demonstrated the risks of involvement in never-ending distant quagmires.

Doing away with Maduro and transforming Venezuela into a US protectorate was a much safer and more controllable bet. Hence, discouraged by the Iran conflict, Trump may be tempted to return to his own reassuring neighborhood. After all, Cuba is waiting for him: “I do believe I’ll be having the honor of taking Cuba . . . I think I can do anything I want with it.” Greenland, likewise, may be worth a second chance. Compelled to join the framework that Russia and China already have underway and responding to a loss of confidence in the wake of the Iran War, the United States might see regional hegemony as its best path forward.

Donroe Doctrine

According to Trump’s Corollary, or simply the Donroe Doctrine, hemispheric dominance has become a national security imperative. Indeed, to “a president who grew up in New York—where businessmen, politicians, and mob bosses’ battle for turf-controlling a neighborhood is common sense . . . . He translates that very parochial New York view to a global view.” Within his own neighborhood, it is easier to answer to his perennial questions: What is in it for the United States? What is in it for me? The Western Hemisphere not only offers a more manageable frame of reference both geographically and historically speaking, but also one characterized by a concrete potential for benefit.

Beyond the domestic implications of controlling drug and migration flows, the allure of immediate, tangible gains also motivates the US pivot to the Western Hemisphere. These include reclaiming Cuba from the claws of Communism and turning it—as in the times of the 1902 Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution—into an US protectorate, or adding Greenland’s more than 836,000 square miles to the US territory. And of course, there is Canada as well—a weaker neighbor that might be swallowed bit by bit, beginning with Alberta’s 255,541 square miles of territory and 170 billion barrels of oil reserves.

Within this ambitioned string of pearls, Latin America’s natural riches are also envisaged. Control over reserves of oil and critical minerals would both boost America’s economic expansion and help oust the annoying Chinese encroachment in that region.

Latin America’s Riches

Latin America’s role within the Donroe Doctrine is substantial, not only as to drugs, immigration, Venezuela, and Cuba, but also concerning critical minerals. In addition to its gigantic oil and gas reserves (basically located in Venezuela), Latin America tops or is close to topping the list of global reserves on several critical minerals. Among these are the rare earths niobium, lithium, graphite, copper, zinc, cobalt, nickel, and silver. This comes at a point in time when critical minerals are seen not just as commodities, but as instruments of geopolitical power. In this regard, rare earths surpass the rest. A group of 17 metallic elements indispensable for modern technology and warfare, they have become immensely valuable trump cards for China, which accounts for 70 percent of their mining and around 90 percent of their refinement. China imposed export controls on seven rare earth minerals and their capacities, which are critical for modern technology and warfare. According to Dewardrick L. McNeal, “by restricting their flow, Beijing did not just flex its industrial muscle, it revealed America’s and the rest of the world’s dangerous vulnerability. China’s latest actions show their readiness and ability to weaponize American and global dependence.”

As it happens, though, Brazil holds 21 million tons of rare earths reserves, second only to China’s 44 million and well ahead of India, which as number three in the list, has 6.9 million tons of reserves. As a whole, Latin America’s global reserves of rare earths stand at 17 percent.

Highly relevant as well is niobium, a strategic critical mineral that enables modern technologies by strengthening materials with minimal weight increase. This is important for the production of superconductors, fusion research reactors, jet engines, spacecraft components, and the miniaturization of electronics. Here again, Brazil plays a leading role, with 98 percent  of the world’s known reserves.

There is also lithium, a metallic element best known for its role in energy-storage technology. Rechargeable and lightweight lithium-ion batteries power electronic devices all around the world, from cell phones to laptops. But besides electronics, these batteries allow for the storage of significant amounts of energy from renewable sources such as solar and wind power—and for electric cars, of course.

Although Trump is not a fan of renewables, the reality is that lithium-ion batteries are needed for nearly everything. As reported by The New York Times: “Military strategists, watching as modern warfare is reinvented in Ukraine, say armed forces will need millions of batteries to power drones, lasers and countless other weapons of the future . . . . Chinese battery dominance has long been a problem for industries like auto manufacturing, but now is increasingly viewed as a national security threat.” Latin America plays, once again, an unsurmountable role in this regard. Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile make up the so called “lithium triangle” that contains 53 percent of the world’s lithium reserves. When Peru is added to them, proven lithium reserves jump to 67 percent. The list of regional critical minerals’ reserves goes on.

Far From Its Control

Washington, however, has a problem. Although located in its own hemisphere, these resources are far from its control. Indeed, for more than two decades, China has been strategically and patiently investing in the exploitation, mining, and refinement of Latin America’s natural resources. Moreover, it has built the infrastructure needed for its domestic and overseas transport.

All throughout this process, China has also become Latin America’s largest lender as well as South America’s biggest trade partner and number two for the region as a whole. Meanwhile, except for its involvement in Mexico, the United States has been missing in action. This absence is difficult to understand, given the country’s historical obsession with controlling its own hemisphere. It is something that might best be explained by the logic of globalization, as the United States essentially oriented its economy toward services, while leaving China in charge manufacturing.

But the synergy that existed between China and the United States, which Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick baptized as “Chimerica,” has been superseded by an emerging Cold War between both countries. With globalization already fading, COVID accelerated this process by utterly disrupting global supply chains. Protectionism has come out on top. All of it motivated the onshoring of US companies. Manufacturing—particularly, high-tech, capital-intensive manufacturing—has returned to the United States, and the country is now in dire need of critical minerals whose supply it does not control. Additional oil sources, likewise, may prove attractive at a moment when domestic shale oil output is peaking and will soon begin diminishing.

Trump’s Answers

Trump has two answers to this conundrum—the soft one and the hard one. The former implies forcefully promoting MAGA-friendly governments throughout the region. This way, the challenge of opening the doors to US companies and reducing the influence of Chinese ones is left to individual governments. So far, this club consists of Argentina’s Milei, El Salvador’s Bukele, Honduras’s Asfura, Ecuador’s Novoa, Paraguay’s Peña, and Chile’s Katz. Bolsonaro Junior is the obvious Trump bet for Brazil’s 2026 presidential elections.

The hard answer, on the other hand, includes threatening, bullying, and even bombing. Venezuela, with its huge oil and gas reserves (as well as rare earths and other critical minerals), became ground zero for the implementation of this approach. Moreover, by targeting Caracas, Trump aimed at providing a dissuasive example—signaling his displeasure to others for welcoming “hostile foreign influence” in the hemisphere. This coincides with threats to take back the Panama Canal as a measure to reduce Chinese influence over the waterway. Indeed, Hong Kong’s company CK Hutchinson, which controlled two strategic ports within the Canal, was compelled to sell these assets to the US BlackRock consortium. And the list goes on: ports, energy, and infrastructure projects linked to China have been singled out as security risks and targeted as a result. Brazil was even threaten with a 10 percent tariff on account of its membership within the BRICS, an organization considered by Washington under  the control of China.

One way or the other, Trump has appropriated for himself the wording of Cleveland’s Secretary of State Richard Onley in his 1895 addendum to the Monroe Doctrine: “Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” This, of course, comes 131 years after the addendum itself.

A Constructive Approach

From a Latin American perspective, more attention from Washington is certainly welcome. However, it should be of a constructive kind. This means that it should aim at winning hearts and minds and seeking larger and mutually beneficial investments—especially because Latin Americans feel infinitely culturally closer to the United States than to China, and would be more than happy to counterweight Beijing’s economic clout with a stronger US presence. Unfortunately, Trump’s second term is ending a long period of indifference toward the region by aggressively intruding into it and setting an abusive standard for the rules of the game.

At this point—with the exception of the MAGA-friendly governments—most Latin American countries are in a survival mode waiting for the next three years to pass as rapidly as possible. They would like, however, that the renewed attention from Washington be maintained by future administrations, albeit taking on a more constructive approach. If this turns out to be the case, Latin America, apart from Mexico, would paradoxically play an outsized global role in an area totally undervalued by Trump: climate change mitigation. In this capacity, the region could develop a productive partnership with the United States.

Such a role would be sustained by three considerations. First, Latin America tops the list of critical minerals’ reserves needed for the manufacturing and storage of clean technologies and energies. By expanding the economic channels associated with the extraction and refinement of these minerals, the United States could also enhance its network of secure supply chains at a time of geopolitical fragmentation. Second, the region holds the most important green lung of the planet: the Amazon rainforest. In August 2023, the eight governments that control it pledged themselves to protect the Amazon against deforestation. Commitments like these not only serve as a basis for greater regional cooperation, but also solicit the support of developed countries. Third, being a minor contributor to climate change, with just 5 percent of CO2 emissions on global scale, Latin America has seriously assumed energy transition. According to the International Energy Agency, “Latin America is one of the world’s leading regions for renewable energy use today.” As such, the region has potential to become a reliable exporter of clean energy. It is only a matter of creating a societal and regulatory environment that favors investment. Let us hope that this becomes possible.

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Alfredo Toro Hardy, Ph.D., is a retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar, and author. He is former Ambassador to the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile, and Singapore, has authored or co-authored thirty-six books on international affairs, and is a former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton University. Dr. Toro Hardy is currently an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.

Image Credit: Executive Office of the President of the United States, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons