Title: Russian Weapons in Turkey: A Trojan Horse?
Russia has historically maintained a strong presence in Eastern European weapons markets. During the Soviet era, Moscow not only supplied arms to its allies in the Warsaw Pact but also assisted them in producing their own weapons. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, various Soviet weapons remained on the territories of the former members who joined NATO. In 1991, Russia expanded its military footprint further in Europe. Although Russia sought closer ties with the West under the leadership of president Boris Yeltsin, Yeltsin did not accept proposals to join the alliance. Instead, Russia entered European defense markets including Turkey, Greece, and Slovakia. Despite the Russian presence, however, Eastern European countries acquired Western equipment and partially integrated some of the Soviet-made weapon systems into NATO to make their militaries more interoperable with NATO.
After Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2014, the former Warsaw Pact countries commenced plans to completely break off contacts with Russian arms and military equipment manufacturers. However, the lack of funds to purchase new Western equipment, difficulties in developing new weapons, and fears of disrupting domestic defense enterprises drove Eastern European countries to extend the use of the Soviet military hardware. The European Union imposed an arms embargo banning the import of Russian military equipment, but allowed both deliveries of arms under the contracts signed before 2014 and imports of spare parts or maintenance services for Russian military equipment that had been purchased by its members before the sanctions. As a result, several Russian defense enterprises continue to repair and modernize the Soviet arsenals of the former Warsaw Pact members.
These arms agreements between NATO members and Russia have historically involved conventional weapons. However, Russia’s recent weapons agreement with Turkey, which resulted in Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s advanced surface-to-air S-400 system, oversteps regular arms transfers because it uniquely involves a strategic weapons system. The S-400, designed to detect and track American aircrafts such as F-22 and F-35, comprises advanced radars and a suite of missiles that can closely follow and destroy targets at a distance of 150 miles and intercept ballistic missiles up to 38 miles away. Turkey maintains that it procured Russia’s missile defense system because Washington did not offer Ankara suitable terms on the U.S. Patriot missile defense system. However, the decision worries NATO because Turkey plays a key role on the alliance’s southern flank—the center of its enduring global security challenges. Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s advanced surface-to-air S-400 system increases Ankara’s military power but undermines NATO’s commitment to eliminate its dependency on Russian military equipment, creating risks and uncertainties for regional security.
Even though many members of the alliance use Russian weapons, NATO opposed Ankara’s decision to adopt the S-400 because the S-400 is incompatible with NATO defenses, and its significant capabilities and flexibilities empower Russia. The missiles will likely interfere with the interoperability of NATO forces and disrupt Ankara’s cooperation with other allies because the system will permit the S-400’s radars to collect intelligence on their F-35 jets, as well as to acquire sensitive data from the Turkish Air Force information network if the systems are linked in the future. Furthermore, Russian specialists installing the system could gather sensitive information manually for at least a year.
Regionally, Ankara’s decision to adopt the S-400 risks miscommunications and miscalculations between states. These risks will inevitably worsen Turkey’s relations with several NATO allies, including potentially driving the United States to relocate military facilities and its nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base to other countries.
Beyond hindering cooperation between NATO and Turkey, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 diametrically opposes the current direction of NATO, which reaffirmed its commitment to eliminate any reliance on Russia’s defense industry. The United States recently developed the European Recapitalization Incentive Program (ERIP) which currently helps Greece, Slovakia, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, and North Macedonia disengage from the Russian defense industrial supply chain. However, the Turkish purchase creates tension within the alliance by encouraging other states to purchase Russian defense products, undermining the transition away from Russian systems. Moreover, Russia’ tactical and targeted approaches to some NATO members, such as Hungary and Italy, enabled Moscow to develop a new strategic situation that could prevent the alliance from supporting the U.S. sanctions and forming a united response to Ankara. For example, President Vladimir Putin has increased Italy’s reliance on Russia’s oil and gas and revitalized Russia’s historical ties with Italian communists and socialists. Similarly, Moscow has welcomed Budapest to join the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project. This situation, if not addressed, could become a chronic challenge for NATO.
Clearly, Moscow has turned its deal with Turkey into a new political instrument to further divide NATO and undermine ties between Ankara and Washington. U.S.-Turkish relations, which were already deteriorating due to Washington’s assistance to the Syrian Kurds, its protection of Erdogan’s rival Fetullah Gulen, and its support for Cyprus, have now decayed further. Following Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400, Washington suspended Ankara from the F-35 program, despite its deposit for the aircrafts and participation in the production of the jets. Turkey now faces additional U.S. sanctions as its deal comes in direct violation of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). However, it is not yet clear whether the US will impose CAATSA sanctions on Turkey or issue a waiver. Nonetheless, increased economic pressures on Turkey and its removal from the F-35 program could place Moscow in a more advantageous relationship with Ankara.
Ankara’s policy aimed at re-establishing Turkey as an influential regional power independent from the United States could prove self-defeating, however. Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy supplies and its determination to build a nuclear power plant with assistance from Rosatom helped catalyze its aspirations to project regional power with assistance from Russia. Yet, the change in Ankara’s strategic thinking has already negatively affected the value of the Turkish lira, dried up foreign direct investment, eroded confidence in Ankara, and created dependency on Russia’s technical maintenance services. Significantly, this thinking limits NATO’s ability to help Turkey during crises, since the alliance’s aircrafts will not fly near the rival system.
Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 demonstrates the significance of clashing interests between Turkey and the West. Ankara is likely to extend its assertive policies and seeks to become an independent regional power, yet given Turkey’s interest in NATO’s security guarantee, military technology, diplomatic tools, and global capabilities, it is unlikely that Ankara desires to drift away from the alliance in the near future. Washington’s ability to constructively shape developments in Turkey has been limited due to the transformation of Turkey’s political landscape, led by the country’s autocratic president. However, Turkey’s declining economic situation and its need for loans could provide the United States with additional tools for managing the relationship and easing tension. Providing economic assistance could enable Washington to prevent armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and refugee flows into Turkey. The United States should also support Turkey’s civil society to sustain its democratic development and counter controlled media and anti-Americanism promoted by the Turkish government. Given rising doubts about Turkey’s strategic reliability, however, the United States must also develop policies to protect its interests and military facilities in Turkey during a crisis, including U.S. nuclear weapons. These policies would provide greater opportunities for the United States to engage with Turkey and address an increasingly complex situation.
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Madina L. Rubly received her M.A. in Global Affairs from Rice University and received special recognition for her capstone project titled, “Russia’s Nuclear Modernization: A Quest for Nonproliferation.” She has co-authored numerous articles and contributed to several books and policy reports focused on non-proliferation, energy security issues, the United States-Russian and Sino-Russian relations, the security environment in the MENA region and Central Asia. She has studied and worked in Almaty, Moscow, St. Petersburg, San Diego, Washington D.C., and Houston. Madina Rubly is a member of the James Baker’s Institute for Public Policy and the World Institute for Nuclear Security.