Title: Amb. Ong Keng Yong on the Role of ASEAN

GJIA: Perhaps you could begin by telling us a bit about your time in the foreign service.

OKY: I joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after I graduated from law school at the National University of Singapore. I was quite happy with the job. It was multifaceted: some people call us political officers, and other people call us economic officers or general service officers. I have served as the Ambassador of Singapore in India and Malaysia. At the end of 2002, I was nominated as the Secretary-General of the ASEAN, where I served for five years. I have now retired, so to speak, from the foreign service. I am still ambassador-at-large, looking after mostly ASEAN affairs, and I am also the Non-Resident Ambassador to Pakistan and Iran.

I want to touch on ASEAN, a regional intergovernmental organization comprising ten vastly diverse Southeast Asian countries. What is the purpose of ASEAN, and what makes cooperation within Southeast Asia possible?

Historically, ASEAN was conceived from the great power competition of the Cold War in the 1960s and 70s. The founding ASEAN members—Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia—did not want Southeast Asia to be drawn into the rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs. There was this idea that Southeast Asia had been used by major powers to carry out their own national interests. At the time, in the context of the Vietnam War, ASEAN’s priority was to preserve the non-communist character of Southeast Asia.

ASEAN has evolved since then. The ideological differences between East and West are still there though not as obvious. The founding five countries made great efforts to unite Southeast Asia as a group, and here we are now with ten countries. Today we have more than thirty sectors of cooperation ranging from agriculture to youth and we hold some 1000 meetings a year at all levels.

You talk about how the initial goal of ASEAN is to preserve neutralism and non-alignment, but ASEAN was created at a time when neither of the major powers geographically bordered with its members. Do you think the architecture of ASEAN is predisposed to preventing a supranational identity from emerging, and do great power politics pose a threat to ASEAN neutralism and non-alignment?

ASEAN is held together by the belief that ten countries can work together to develop the region while promoting their national interests. We are often compared to the European Union (EU), but the main difference between us and the EU is that we accept that diversity between member states will always be there. Despite this diversity, we think that we can leverage the strengths of each member state to promote an organization that serves three purposes. First, ASEAN strives to preserve the strategic autonomy of Southeast Asian countries. Second, we synergize the energy on the economic front, since we are collectively more significant than we are individually. ASEAN is regarded as the fifth largest economy on the global stage, and will be the fourth by 2030. Something interesting is that over sixty percent of the population of ASEAN is under thirty-five years of age, and this paints a relatively attractive economic picture for foreign investors. The final purpose of ASEAN is how to deal with global issues. There are issues beyond a bigger economy and more political bargaining power, such as climate change mitigation, food security policies, and humanitarian relief. Although from time to time it has been difficult to organize a common position, ASEAN has learned to cope with the differences within us. In some cases, when we know we cannot find a solution, we ensure that the problem does not blow up a big challenge for us. The hope is that the good will always be more than the bad.

Recently, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was signed between ASEAN and Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. Is this an example of how ASEAN helps Southeast Asian countries play a greater role on the global stage?

The RCEP is a very topical subject. The idea for an RCEP started inside ASEAN. There seems to be a narrative in some media outlets that the RCEP was invented by China to exercise domination over other Asian economies. That is wrong. Sometime in the early 2000s, ASEAN leaders thought that it would be a good idea to bring all the different ASEAN agreements with its trading partners into a systematic framework. The RCEP benefits us in two ways. First, ASEAN can stay competitive vis-à-vis other major powers such as Europe and the United States. Second, there is more incentive for the respective governments of ASEAN member states to accelerate economic integration. This idea gained traction, and each of the sixteen partners involved saw its strategic advantages. Unfortunately, India is currently not part of the RCEP for reasons including its differing perceptions on bilateral trade with China, but the rest of the partners are moving forward with the RCEP, and we hope that India will eventually join.

Collectively, we make up thirty percent of global gross domestic product—a very substantial portion of the economic pie. But what is more important is that the RCEP reinforces the convening power of ASEAN. ASEAN may not be comparable to economies such as that of China or Japan, but we are the core of this package, economically and geographically. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is also a wonderful boost to public confidence. The pandemic has been a huge challenge, but we hope that RCEP will invite more investment into our region.