What is the CSTO?
The CSTO is a military alliance that brings together six post-Soviet countries into a mutual security pact. It originated out of the collapse of the Soviet Union, during which Russia and five other newly independent states (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) on May 15, 1992. All the parties were interested in avoiding the potential dangers associated with a regional security vacuum, which could have led to intraregional conflicts and the intervention of external powers; thus, they joined the CST as a solution to their fears.
For Russia, the CST was a chief means to maintain its regional dominance and protect its self-declared zone of “privileged interests.” For the weaker states, however, binding themselves to Russia was a means to signal to Moscow that they were not potential security liabilities. Consequently, in aiming to avoid potential Russian military interventions, these CST states put into practice the dictum of keeping one’s friends close but one’s (potential) enemies closer.
In 2002, this security architecture was upgraded into the CSTO, establishing a new international organization and formal institution to implement the 1992 document. Initially, the CSTO “existed mostly as a paper structure” and served primarily to formalize Russian weapon transfers and training. It also served as a mechanism to legitimize the maintenance of the Kremlin’s military bases outside of the Russian Federation through a multilateral, rather than unilateral or bilateral, veneer.
Yet rather than being a truly multilateral alliance, the CSTO was closer to a series of spokes all originating from Moscow, and, should Moscow have faltered in its responsibilities, there would have been little left holding it together. However, during the 2010s, the CSTO took several steps to transform itself into a stronger and more purposeful security mechanism. Nonetheless, it remained rather weak and dependent upon Russia to function.
The Slow, and Then Quick Death of the CSTO
As long as the alliance served its members’ interests, the security infrastructure envisioned by the CSTO could be maintained, but this did not come to fruition.
Specifically, the 2010 failure of the CSTO to comply with Kyrgyzstan’s request to counter ethnic clashes in the southern part of its country is seen by many as the beginning of the institution’s irrelevance. This event occurred as a result of the claim that the alliance’s mandate only extended to external aggression, not domestic instability, which prompted Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to ask: “What sort of organization is this one, if there is bloodshed in one of our member states … and this body keeps silent?”
The foundations of the CSTO were further undercut by Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its open support for the secession of ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. The consequences of these events were acutely felt in Belarus and Kazakhstan, given their mutual borders with the Russian Federation and their ethnic and cultural connections to Russia—both of which Moscow could exploit to enact another “Ukraine scenario” on their soil.
In an instant, Russia went from being viewed as a “benevolent hegemon” to a “neighborhood bully,” and Minsk and Astana found themselves in an “intra-alliance security dilemma,” aligned with an irredentist with potential plans for their countries. However, neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan sought to withdraw from the CSTO in part because that would have given Moscow the excuse it needed to intervene. Yet, there were clear signs that both Belarus and Kazakhstan sought to distance themselves from their ostensible alliance partner by taking concrete steps to secure their country’s sovereignty through changes to their national security doctrine, rhetoric, and policy.
Another failure occurred when the CSTO was unwilling to heed Armenia’s call to protect the ethnic-Armenian exclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. Despite the protection of their co-nationals being among Armenia’s most important national security interests, Moscow outright refused to assist, asserting that since the hostilities were “not taking place on Armenian territory,” the CSTO security guarantees did not apply.
Notably, the peacekeeping force sent to Nagorno-Karabakh following a Russian-brokered ceasefire in November of that year was not under CSTO auspices but rather through Moscow’s sole authority, another symbol of the CSTO’s unwillingness to assist Armenia. The following year, the Kremlin dismissed border skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia proper as not enough to invoke the CSTO’s mutual defense provisions. The alliance was also powerless in the face of border clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2021. One commentator explained the alliance’s inaction as rooted in the fact that its charter merely prohibits war between two of its member states, as opposed to aggression like in the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan situation.
Thus, Russian action or inaction caused the CSTO to fail at almost every level. Still, the alliance may have been able to move past these events since arguments for inaction were technically justifiable, and Moscow could ensure its allies that Crimea/Donbas was a one-off event. However, all this would be upended in early 2022.
The Year CSTO Died
There was a brief possibility of revival of the CSTO in January 2022, when CSTO peacekeepers were deployed to Kazakhstan to assist the regime of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Even though the bulk of the troops sent were from Russia, the region finally witnessed the alliance in action to safeguard regional stability. However, this hope along with the entire alliance’s viability was quickly dashed with Russia’s full-bore invasion of Ukraine a month later.
None of the other CSTO members formally recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, and no troops from the non-Russian CSTO countries were deployed to support Russia’s war. Russia’s annexation of four additional Ukrainian provinces was likewise rejected by CSTO members, a subtle affirmation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Moreover, except for Lukashenko, who remains persona non grata in the West as a result of the 2020 crackdown against the democratic opposition, CSTO leaders have sought to foster positive relations with the West and China. For example, Kazakhstan’s Tokayev dismissed any notion that he owed the Kremlin a debt for the events of January 2022. Instead, Astana intensified its long-standing policy of undertaking a ‘multivector’ foreign policy, balancing the country’s ties between Russia, the West, and China.
Making matters worse for Russia were the war’s negative externalities: the slow pace of the invasion and the need to reinforce its military saw Moscow pulling some troops out of other parts of the region to devote to Ukraine. Consequently, Russia failed to fulfill its regional leadership role by ignoring renewed and escalating clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in September 2022, when Tajikistan reportedly sent troops across the border. Rather than opposing what many Kyrgyz saw as an “invasion,” Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to honor his Tajik counterpart “for the provision of regional stability and security” with an award. In response, Kyrgyzstan abruptly canceled CSTO joint military exercises that were due to take place later that month.
That same month, Azerbaijan took advantage of the regional chaos to initiate clashes with Armenia along their mutual border. A year later, Baku launched a full-scale offensive against Armenian-occupied territories, quickly overwhelming ethnic-Armenian forces and pushing aside the remaining Russian peacekeepers to seize full control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite the death of some Russian forces and, again, reported strikes into Armenia proper, Russia once again stayed silent. In fact, some Russian officials openly criticized Yerevan and the Karabakh-Armenians for provoking Azerbaijan, implying that Armenia was insufficiently loyal to Russia. Hence, Russia demonstrated to the rest of the CSTO that its interests were the only ones that held water.
What Does the Future Hold?
If alliances are fundamentally built upon trust and power, then the CSTO’s future seems bleak. The continual undermining of the alliance’s core principles appears to have created a strategic opening for external powers.
Maximizing stability will require a soft touch. The best policy for Washington, Brussels, and Beijing is to put into practice a quote often attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte: “Never interfere with an enemy while he’s making a mistake.” Russia has come nowhere close to achieving its overarching goal of establishing hegemony over the post-Soviet space. In fact, Russia has only weakened its regional geopolitical influence and popular support. Rather than binding them closer, Russia’s CSTO allies have redoubled their efforts to cultivate ties with the U.S./West and China during 2023. And there’s no indication that this will stop in 2024.
Foreign powers must understand that the multilayered relationships between Russia and other CSTO members cannot be broken overnight. Forcing these countries to conclusively choose a ‘bloc’ will likely prove counterproductive, as they would be hesitant to risk provoking the region’s still-dominant power. Instead, the United States and Europe should materially reward these states for both asserting their geopolitical independence and engaging in hedging behavior by seeking out ways to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties with them.
Some countries will be more receptive to this than others. Kazakhstan has probably gone the farthest, as its outreach to the West and China has been reciprocated. Armenia is justifiably rethinking its myopic dependence on Russia for its security following the Kremlin’s inaction in the Caucasus, boycotting the November 2023 CSTO summit in Minsk. Although Yerevan declared that it was not planning to leave the alliance, some comments by the Armenian Prime Minister were less definitive.
This comes in the context of the broader deterioration of the Armenian-Russian relationship: not only has Yerevan actively sought to improve relations with the West, but it has also joined the International Criminal Court, which has indicted Putin for war crimes. Paul Globe referred to Armenian-Russian relations as being in “crisis,” and we are now seeing this reflected in Yerevan’s recent suspension and “de facto freeze” of its involvement in the CSTO, with additional threats to make this a “de jure” change in its relationship toward the alliance.
While Belarus will almost certainly go the way of Lukashenko, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are likely not too far behind their counterparts in rethinking their relationship with Russia. Allowing what Moscow set in motion to take its due course, and nudging it along the way, will likely prove to be the most fruitful to further weaken Russia’s bedrock regional security system.
Regional Implications
What would the unraveling of this system mean for the region? Three outcomes are most likely – none of which are mutually exclusive. First, we have already seen conflicts in the region intensify as Russia becomes an absentee security provider. There is little reason to believe that this trend will reverse, thus creating a regional environment increasingly characterized by instability.
Second, it could also create an opening for outside powers to increase their influence in the region either through bilateral ties with the post-Soviet states or by filling the vacuum left by Moscow. We see substantial evidence of the first in terms of the West’s reciprocal inroads with Kazakhstan and Armenia. Regarding the latter, these countries may begin to look beyond Moscow to help resolve their issues. For example, one could imagine China, which has positive relations with the Central Asian states, being invited to mediate between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Finally, all of this will make Russia even more insecure as it sees its sphere of influence slipping away. We have already seen in Ukraine how Moscow responds to perceived insecurity. While its options at present are limited by the Ukrainian quagmire, eventually that war will end. And the region may find itself with a Russia desperate to restore its regional hegemony – not a promising prospect for the post-Soviet states.
The CSTO is not going to go away overnight, but it will be an alliance in name only, something more akin to the latter stages of the failed, Cold War-era Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, rather than the NATO alliance it was modeled upon. For now, though, the CSTO will continue to shamble on, not quite dead, but not truly amongst the living.
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Dr. Thomas Ambrosio is a professor of political science at North Dakota State University, USA, where he has taught in the Department of Political Science & Public Policy since 2000. His research interests include the domestic and international politics of the former Soviet Union, authoritarianism, authoritarian diffusion and learning, critical geopolitics, and ludic studies.
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons
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