Introduction
Balochistan has long been at the center of tensions between the federal government and Baloch nationalist movements, stemming from political marginalization, economic exploitation, and state repression. Despite its rich natural resources and strategic location, it remains one of Pakistan’s most underdeveloped and volatile regions. These tensions have periodically erupted into armed conflict, with the current insurgency gaining momentum in the early 2000s.
A major turning point occurred in 2006 with the killing of Akbar Bugti, a veteran political leader and tumandar (leader) of the Bugti tribe, who had served as Chief Minister, Governor, and Federal Minister of State. His death at the hands of the Pakistan Army over political disagreements ignited a low-level separatist movement that soon escalated into a protracted conflict. Over time, sporadic attacks on security forces and infrastructure evolved into full-scale guerrilla warfare, with targeted assassinations and bombings against state and military installations. By 2022, militant groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) escalated their attacks, primarily targeting the Pakistan Army, Rangers, and Frontier Corps. These groups, largely dominated by the Marri and Bugti tribes, operate from safe havens in Afghanistan, driven by longstanding grievances over resource exploitation, identity politics, and federal mismanagement.
Balochistan’s internal divisions along tribal, linguistic, sectarian, and class lines have historically fragmented its political landscape. However, the Pakistan Army’s heavy-handed tactics, including collective punishment, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, have deepened resentment and, paradoxically, fostered greater unity among disparate Baloch factions. These groups range from moderates advocating for political rights to hardline separatists demanding full independence, yet their shared opposition to state repression has drawn them together. Traditionally, the Baloch middle class—concentrated in Karachi and along the Makran coast—remained distant from tribal militant movements. However, growing disillusionment with state policies has radicalized this group, leading many into human rights advocacy and fueling demands for greater political freedoms. As a result, an uneasy yet potent coalition has emerged, where armed resistance and peaceful activism exist in parallel, each reinforcing the broader struggle against state repression.
2024 saw a significant uptick in violence in Balochistan. In August alone, approximately seventy-four people were killed, including fourteen soldiers. In October, an attack near Karachi airport injured at least ten people, including two Chinese nationals. The following month, a suicide bombing at Quetta Railway Station claimed thirty-two lives and injured fifty-five others. The BLA claimed responsibility for these attacks, which increasingly target infrastructure, Chinese workers, Punjabi civilians, and military personnel. Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces provide insurgents access to abandoned American weaponry, further intensifying the conflict. Despite government claims of a weakened insurgency, the latest attacks demonstrate the insurgents’ capacity for coordinated, high-impact operations.
In response, the federal government, under pressure from Beijing to safeguard Chinese workers, has launched yet another military offensive against Baloch militants. However, this heavy-handed approach has backfired, exacerbating the crisis, uniting various Baloch factions, and strengthening their resolve against the state. While the military formally acknowledges human rights advocacy as legitimate, its continued reliance on coercion contradicts this stance and further alienates the population. This article argues that achieving lasting peace in Balochistan will require addressing human rights abuses, scaling back military aggression, and rebuilding trust through meaningful political dialogue and reconciliation.
Federal Overreach and the Source of the Insurgency
Balochistan’s persistent insurgency stems not from external interference or mere tribal opposition, as the Pakistani government often claims, but from Islamabad’s exploitative policies and the erosion of federalism. Rather than embracing a decentralized governance structure, the central government has sought hegemonic control, evident in the pervasive influence of the military and the security agencies over governance, development, and law enforcement. This dominance undermines elected provincial leadership, further centralizing power and marginalizing regional autonomy.
A key driver of unrest is Islamabad’s treatment of Balochistan as a resource-rich periphery, prioritized for extraction rather than development. Projects such as the Sui Gas Fields and the Saindak and Reko Diq mines generate significant revenue for the federal government, yet the province receives minimal returns. Despite constitutional provisions granting provinces control over their natural resources, Balochistan remains economically sidelined, deepening local resentment.
The erosion of federal autonomy has been exacerbated by repeated violations of constitutional principles, particularly those enshrined in the Eighteenth Amendment, which expanded provincial rights and devolved power. The current insurgency was ignited by President General Pervez Musharraf’s unilateral decision in 2002 to construct Gwadar Port, bypassing key constitutional structures such as the National Assembly, the Council of Common Interest, and the Balochistan Provincial government.
Akbar Bugti, leader of the Jamhoori Wattan Party and a vocal critic of the project, opposed its construction due to concerns over internal migration and its impact on provincial politics. He also demanded guarantees that the port’s development would benefit local communities through employment opportunities. Negotiations with a Senate Committee led by Mushahid Hussain were nearing consensus when Musharraf, frustrated by the slow progress, launched a military operation in Dera Bugti in 2005. This offensive forced Bugti and his supporters into hiding, culminating in his death at the hands of security forces in 2006. His killing ignited a low-level insurgency for Baloch independence that has endured for nearly two decades. Once criticized for his collaboration with Islamabad, Bugti’s death transformed him into a symbol of resistance, reviving separatist demands that had largely faded since General Zia’s rapprochement with Baloch dissidents in the 1980s.
Doubling Down on Coercion and the Mobilization of the Baloch Middle Class
Rather than quelling unrest, the state’s reliance on brutal suppression has only deepened grievances and strengthened resistance. Baloch insurgent groups operate within a broader political spectrum, with demands ranging from greater cultural, economic, and political rights to full autonomy or outright secession. Despite this diversity, the Pakistani military has consistently conflated all Baloch demands with separatism, branding legitimate grievances as anti-Pakistan nationalism. This indiscriminate approach has not only failed to address underlying issues but has also reinforced the insurgents’ resolve, perpetuating a cycle of violence and state repression.
The Pakistani state’s entrenched sense of superiority and colonial mindset has further exacerbated the crisis in Balochistan. Rather than learning from past failures, the military persists with its oppressive tactics, including the detention of critics without due process, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings in military camps. Since 2021, fatalities have steadily increased, reaching 322 in 2024. While the frequency of attacks has declined, the rising fatalities are partially attributed to the insurgents’ growing use of suicide attacks, which they perceive as a more effective means of resistance. Though the majority of Baloch people remain uninvolved in violent actions, a small yet significant segment of the middle class—including women—has joined militant groups like the BLA, with some even becoming part of its suicide wing, the Majeed Brigade.
Despite the existence of a counterinsurgency strategy on paper, the government has failed to address the root causes of the conflict or win over the Baloch people. Instead, the military continues to rely on colonial-era tactics, such as collective punishment, in place of any meaningful effort at reconciliation. This strategy often includes promoting vigilantism, sometimes sectarian, to divide Baloch society. Two death squads, operating with state sanction—the Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Aman Balochistan, led by Siraj Raisani, and the Baloch Musla Defai Tanzeem, headed by Shafiq Mengal—have been reportedly involved in abducting and killing Baloch activists.
The persistence of the insurgency, now approaching two decades, underscores the failure of harsh tactics to suppress opposition. While the insurgency continues to escalate, there has been a notable shift in the mobilization of Baloch society, particularly among the middle class. This group has increasingly demanded political reform and adherence to constitutional rights, utilizing peaceful methods like protests and petitions rather than violence. This shift is a response to the intensifying repression, which often targets nonviolent opposition. The scale of this repression is reflected in the disputed figures for missing persons. Baloch sources claim up to 7,000 cases, while the Government of Pakistan’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances reports 2,752. Irrespective of the precise figure, Human Rights Watch has condemned Pakistani security forces for committing “serious human rights violations,” including arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial executions. Rather than engaging with the growing middle class, the military has responded with further hostility, deepening the alienation of Baloch society.
Conclusion: The Path to Political Negotiations and Lasting Reconciliation
Resolving the Balochistan insurgency will require meaningful political negotiations between the insurgents, Baloch political parties, activists, the army, and the federal government. While essential, such negotiations are increasingly difficult. Past initiatives such as the Aghaz-e-Haqooq reform package, launched by President Asif Ali Zardari in 2009, sought to address Baloch grievances by promoting demilitarization and creating greater economic opportunities. However, subsequent efforts, including those led by Balochistan Chief Minister Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch in 2015, failed largely due to insurgents’ deep mistrust of the government’s ability to control its security forces. These efforts were undermined by continued military repression, rendering promises of reform hollow and further deepening the Baloch population’s sense of betrayal.
To foster an environment conducive to political negotiations, there must be a shift from indiscriminate counterinsurgency tactics, which disproportionately harm civilians, to a strategy that addresses developmental challenges, curbs federal overreach, and upholds democratic norms and human rights. Implementing existing constitutional provisions, particularly those related to provincial autonomy under the Eighteenth Amendment, could significantly improve the situation. The Eighteenth Amendment expanded provincial autonomy, strengthened provincial rights, and facilitated the devolution of power, granting provinces significant control over their resources.
However, for successful negotiations, accountability for forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings must be addressed, with a possible truth and reconciliation process modeled after South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This process would enable both insurgents and military personnel to reintegrate into society without fear of reprisal, based on a political consensus similar to the 1999 Charter for Democracy. Given the judiciary’s increased independence in the post-Musharraf era, such efforts could be spearheaded by a Supreme Court judge to ensure impartiality and legitimacy.
Achieving these changes, however, will require diminishing the military’s dominant role in both Balochistan and the national level. Forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, not limited to Balochistan but also occurring in the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, further reflect the broader issue. The military’s use of the insurgency as a pretext to consolidate its national authority and undermine the Eighteenth Amendment’s devolution of power highlights a broader democratic crisis in Pakistan, where military dominance perpetuates governance failures and stifles accountability.
Ultimately, lasting peace in Balochistan will depend on prioritizing political solutions over indiscriminate use of force, which will help lay the groundwork for meaningful negotiations. However, addressing the critical issue of accountability for enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings remains a significant hurdle. A truth and reconciliation process could be a potential solution that holds both insurgents and security forces accountable while fostering reintegration. Yet, the success of this approach hinges on the broader expansion of democratic norms and processes at all levels of government in Pakistan.
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Dr. Yunas Samad is a Professor of South Asian Studies and an Associate Fellow of Political Science at Lahore University of Management Sciences, as well as an Emeritus Professor at Bradford University. His research focuses on transnationalism, ethnicity, nationalism, Islam, and identity politics in South Asia and its diaspora. Currently, he is researching China-Pakistan relations. He is the author of The War and Terror and Pakistan: Jihadis, Military and the People – The Struggle for Control (Hurst and Co, London, 2011) and co-editor, alongside R. Long, G. Sing, and I. Talbot, of Beyond Islam and Security: State and Nation-building in Pakistan since 1947 (Routledge, Abingdon 2016).
Image Credit: Michael Foley, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0, via Flickr
