Introduction
The last ten years of counterterrorism in West Africa are difficult to characterize as anything other than a failure. Notwithstanding interventions from France and the United States, the region has seen an unrelenting increase in attacks and territorial influence by so-called “jihadist” armed groups linked to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.[i] Under-resourced and pursuing French-led military strategies that ultimately failed to contain jihadist operations, civilian governments in Mali and Burkina Faso were rocked by military coups. Later, Niger, which had adopted a different approach incorporating dialogue with militants, succumbed to the same fate. Historical critiques of colonialism and contemporary grievances concerning the perceived ineffectiveness of military action discredited French and US interventions, leading to both countries’ withdrawal from the three Sahel states. Filling the void left by Western withdrawal, these newly installed military governments are now aligned with Russia, adding a layer of global geopolitical tension to local crises in the region. Most worryingly, jihadist groups in the region are threatening to expand further into neighboring countries on the southern coast of West Africa.
Western-supported counterterrorism efforts underperformed for several reasons. Most notably, French and American strategies failed to recognize the strategic focus of armed group activities: Sahelian populations and their economic networks. States in the region and their Western supporters conducted ineffective and highly militarized, ‘enemy-centric’ counterterrorism that contributed to serious human rights violations, civilian deaths, gender-based violence, and displacement. This ultimately alienated populations in areas affected by violence. Jihadists from Mali to Nigeria have, by contrast, practiced an effective form of ‘population-focused’ revolutionary insurgency. Capitalizing on years of minimal state presence, declining provision of government services, and the often empty talk of “Western-style” governance, jihadists in the wider Sahel have implemented their own social and economic structures, cementing their territorial influence and strategic advantage. Whether it is the al-Qaeda-aligned JNIM in the Western Sahel or the Islamic State “provinces” present in both the Western Sahel and the Lake Chad regions, most major groups have adopted broadly similar approaches.
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and senior French military officers were aware of the limitations of confining counterterrorism efforts largely to the killing of jihadists. France, however, effectively outsourced protection to local actors and the United Nations, which the former were at times unwilling and the latter unable, to provide. Moreover, for a French president eyeing withdrawal, changes in strategy became increasingly hard to make over time. [ii] Unfortunately, local governments and their new Russian military partners appear to have doubled down on the enemy-centric approach of counterterrorism with civilian deaths and wider harms continuing to grow.
It is time for a reset. Future strategy must recognize the modus operandi of the jihadist groups and strategically prioritize the protection of civilian lives, property and livelihoods. Doing so promises not only a more successful approach that effectively challenges jihadist efforts to control the population, but one that aligns with Western interveners’ legal obligations and proclaimed values, thus minimizing political risk when engaging with Russian-aligned Sahelian governments.
An Adaptable Foe’s Revolutionary Warfare Playbook
Sahelian jihadist groups have successfully employed a strategy of “revolutionary warfare” to achieve their goals. Bernard Fall, the preeminent scholar of insurgencies, defined revolutionary warfare as “guerrilla warfare plus political action.” Crucially, revolutionary warfare is a political strategy that Sahelian jihadists draw from global jihadist organizations. While they have not always done so, groups in the Sahel—aligned with either IS and al-Qaeda—are increasingly following the type of revolutionary warfare strategies that global jihadist groups have publicly explained on several occasions. [iii]
Insurgents from Mali to the Lake Chad area combine escalating military action with forms of political, economic, and social governance, leveraging the synergies between the two. Groups start by launching guerrilla hit-and-run attacks against local, isolated security forces. They also kill and kidnap local political figures, religious leaders, and civilian communities who challenge them. For example, as has often been seen in Nigeria, those who engage with the government or military, or who refuse to pay taxes to the jihadists, receive harsh punishment, sometimes including execution. As jihadist groups capture more weapons and gain more experience, campaigns progress from small-scale ambushes against local security forces to more complex attacks against bases and towns, yielding more captured weapons and other resources. Extensive losses force militaries to eventually pull back, especially from rural areas that are difficult to operate in, such as Mali’s Menaka region or around the islands of Lake Chad, leaving civilians to either flee or acquiesce to jihadist demands.
This strategy creates a positive feedback loop for Sahelian jihadists: they drive out security forces, cement their control over newly exposed communities, extract their resources, and invest those resources into more advanced military operations. Thus, civilian control lies at the heart of jihadist strategies. Given that the alternative can be an absent or violent state, jihadi governance may appeal to some civilians.
However, once integrated into jihadist governance systems, civilians are forced to serve as recruits, taxpayers, and sources of intelligence. Specifically, jihadists often tax farmers and livestock herders as well as workers in other economic sectors like mining. While this “taxation” relies on harsh punishments to enforce compliance and can be exploitative, citizens across the Sahel have experienced a long history of arbitrary and abusive taxation. As such, jihadist taxation is not always seen negatively, as it can be well-administered (with groups like IS even issuing receipts to avoid double taxation) and is accompanied by the provision of basic services such as the opening of markets and basic forms of education.
Finally, IS and al-Qaeda-linked groups offer something in high demand but often lacking in the rural Sahel: protection. This protection can be from other militants (such as in IS’s Lake Chad-based province protecting communities from ‘Boko Haram’ fighters), criminal actors, or even the state or state proxies. However, jihadist groups are often protecting civilians in conflicts that they themselves helped stoke. This protection frequently extends to economic activity that, as previously mentioned, the jihadists tax. In a context of extreme violence and unpredictability, the chance of safety can be compelling enough to accept the downsides.
Civilian Protection as a Strategy
Civilian protection should play a key strategic role in tackling West African jihadist groups, given that civilians represent these groups’ central focus. Civilians are both a target and a resource for armed groups. Thus, controlling them represents a key pillar of their success as insurgents. As such, abuses by state forces make support for armed groups—passing intelligence, running errands, and recruiting fighters—more likely. Moreover, states in the region have legal mandates to protect human rights and property in their constitutions and other guiding legislation, leaving civilian protection legally, not only strategically, necessary.
To implement an effective civilian protection strategy, local military leaders and counterparts (Western or other) must minimize human rights violations and mitigate civilian harm. The Nigerian government, facing more than a decade of jihadist militancy, increasingly recognizes this, presenting some positive examples for others. For instance, the Nigerian military has created the “Human Rights Desk of the Nigerian Armed Forces.” While not ubiquitous, soldiers now also conduct farm and firewood patrols to protect civilians from attack, abduction, forced recruitment, and sexual violence. Likewise, “quick impact projects,” are designed to provide support to embattled communities, helping the government regain public trust. Finally, Nigeria’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) policies have begun making progress in depleting the ranks of armed groups. While this suite of measures represents progress, more action is needed across the wider Sahel region.
Moreover, militaries must monitor civilian harms and introduce tactical training on civilian engagement for soldiers on the frontlines. They must also adopt a zero-tolerance approach to abuse and sexual violence, while publicly praising and promoting leaders who excel in civilian protection. Likewise, they must ensure effective communication with populations to challenge jihadist narratives and ensure civilian protection approaches are understood by the population.
Conclusion
Given the failures of a decade of counterterrorism in the Sahel, recalibration is essential. Centering efforts around civilian protection can help to turn the tide against insurgent groups. Not only is this strategy legally and morally sound, but it is also key to long-term success against jihadist insurgents. Such an approach is strategic primarily because it directly targets the central focus of jihadist armed groups: control over civilian populations. Without this civilian control, militants are exposed, isolated, and devoid of resources. From the perspective of Western states, cooperation in civilian protection could provide opportunities for strategic engagement with West African states with reduced political risk, despite their new closeness with Russia. There is, therefore, much to gain from exploring cooperation around a strategically focused civilian protection strategy.
[i] We use ‘jihadist’ to refer to violent armed opposition groups that claim to be engaged in a ‘jihad’. We recognize, however, the much broader history and meaning of the team ‘jihad’ within wider Islamic thought and that the vast majority of Muslims reject these groups’ actions and legitimations.
[ii] Interviews with EU and French Officials in Brussels and Paris, 2021-22.
[iii] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi has translated ISIS documents that capture their general approach to insurgency and the seizing of territorial control that, in turn, allows them to implement their form of governance. See here for example.
. . .
Dr. Ed Stoddard is an Associate Professor in International Security at the University of Portsmouth in the UK. He is also an Affiliated Fellow in the Emerging Research in International Security (ERIS) Research Group at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, a Visiting Professor (War Studies) at the College of Europe, Natolin in Warsaw, and an Associate Member of the Centre for War and Diplomacy at Lancaster University.
Professor Tony Chafer is Emeritus Professor in West African and French Studies at the University of Portsmouth and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London.
Professor Isaac Olawale Albert is Professor of African History, Peace, and Conflict Studies and was Pioneer Dean of the Faculty of Multidisciplinary Studies (2018-2023) at the University of Ibadan. He is Editor-in-Chief of the African Journal on Terrorism based at the African Union’s Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (Algiers, Algeria).
Dr. Brema Ely Dicko is a Malian sociologist and anthropologist. He is former Head of Department for the Dept of Sociology and Anthropology at l‘Université des Sciences Humaines de Bamako, Mali.
Chitra Nagarajan works on conflict, human rights, and peacebuilding with a focus on conflict analysis, climate security, defending human rights, engaging security agencies, and protection of civilians, across West Africa. Her forthcoming book, The World Was in Our Hands: Voices from the Boko Haram Conflict, will be published by Cassava Republic Press in October 2024.
Babacar Ndiaye is an analyst on political and security issues. He is Director of Research for the Senegal-based citizen think tank WATHI. He holds a Professional Master 2 in International Relations from the University of Auvergne Clermont 1 (France). Babacar Ndiaye works mainly on issues of governance, security, and terrorism in West Africa.
Dr. Mamoudou Sy is a historian and lecturer in modern and contemporary African history, professor of history, and Head of the Department of Social Sciences at the Faculty of Social and Environmental Sciences of the University of Sine Saloum El Hadji Ibrahima Niass of Kaolack (USSEIN).
Image Credit: United States Marine Corps, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
