Georgetown Journal of International Affairs: Dr. Anastasakis, your work often highlights the enduring influence of historical experiences on contemporary politics. In what ways do you believe Greece’s historical experiences, ranging from economic crises to periods of political instability, are shaping its current approach to challenges such as economic reform and institutional accountability?
Dr. Anastasakis: The legacies of certain historical periods and events are very important in shaping attitudes and responses to contemporary challenges in all national settings. History does not simply fade away. It is there for comparisons and lessons learned or unlearned. It affects how countries shape the present and how they respond to challenges during different periods in time. And they particularly affect collective and individual memories of societies in consensual or divisive manners.
In Greece’s case, there are historical events that remain very important but are not necessarily remembered in a consensual way. The Greek Civil War, the dictatorship of 1967, and the more recent economic crisis have all left lasting scars on the national psyche. Such events shape not just the national collective and individual memories but also how political elites interact with each other. They can be deeply polarizing and highly emotional.
However, there are also historical moments that foster more unity. The Asia Minor Catastrophe is remembered by all as a national trauma, but one that Greece successfully overcame with time. The transition to democracy after the military junta is generally regarded as a positive turning point despite the challenges that followed and the multiplicity of outcomes that these generated. The accession to the European Union is another historical event that is remembered in a more positive uniform way by Greek politics and society.
Whether the past becomes a source of division or unity often depends on the political and economic context at the time. When Greece is stable politically and performing well economically, historical divides tend to fade. In times of crisis, such as the recent economic turmoil, historical divisions re-emerge, shaping politics and provoking societal ruptures.
GJIA: Greece has maintained a fairly stable government over the past six years. How can it sustain this stability, and how might this contribute to a more cohesive and forward-looking EU agenda, particularly as larger member states like Germany and France experience political fragmentation?
Dr. Anastasakis: The fact that the Greek political system survived a very severe economic crisis demonstrates that it is a consolidated democracy, especially when compared with so many other autocratic cases around it in Turkey, Serbia, Hungary, or Russia.
That said, some persistent pathologies remain. Democratic consolidation is one thing, the quality of democracy is another. Problems with the rule of law, media ties to political interests, and bureaucratic inefficiencies continue to challenge Greece’s democratic governance. The recent Tempi train disaster resulting in the tragic death of so many young people, for example, exposed the serious dysfunctions in the state administration and the weaknesses of the party system including a lot of political irresponsibility. The way that this was handled created an understandably strong reaction among Greek society.
Compared to other European countries, the Greek government may appear relatively stable but we also need to acknowledge its growing unpopularity and weakening effectiveness to deliver. Much of this apparent political stability has to do with the fragmentation of the political opposition which is always a very risky situation for any European multiparty democracy. When opposition is fragmented, the government elites are prone to the mismanagement of the political process and often exhibit complacency and self-righteousness.
Political stability and democracy are never guaranteed. Governments must constantly work to maintain public confidence and build trust, otherwise they can provoke wide public backlash, especially in the absence of a solid opposition. And who benefits from that in most European societies? The far-right parties. While the latter are loud, aggressive, and dangerous, thankfully they are not yet dominant in Greece, but they do exist. They can bring havoc under unstable circumstances as the case of the Golden Dawn has proven through its criminal interferences in Greek politics and society.
Greece has political stability today, which is a welcome development, but this is not identical to substantive democracy. Complacency, failure to implement reforms and social justice, or an inability to address persistent problems with the state administration can always threaten the long-term sustainability of the system.
GJIA: Looking at broader European and Eastern Mediterranean issues, we have seen periodic crises in the Aegean, such as in 1987, 1996, and more recently in 2020. What lessons should Greece and the European Union draw from these incidents to improve crisis management and prevent further geopolitical tensions in the region?
Dr. Anastasakis: Europe is currently dealing with crucial military and defense crises, particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East. As a result, Greek-Turkish tensions are not a top priority for European policymakers.
Greek-Turkish relations remain a bilateral issue, as far as the European Union is concerned. As long as tensions in the Aegean stay under control by the two sides and there is no immediate threat of conflict, European states remain broadly uninterested. From a European defense perspective, however, and in view of Trump’s increasing Europhobia, Turkey has become a crucial ally in military matters that Europe cannot afford to alienate.
While this is a risky strategy given Turkey’s autocratic rule and relations with Russia, European states want to keep Turkey engaged and avoid a breakdown in relations. This is also because Turkey plays a crucial role in managing migration flows, which European countries want to avoid having to deal with.
GJIA: Looking ahead, what are the emerging trends and challenges in European integration and geopolitics? What areas do you see as particularly critical at this moment?
Dr. Anastasakis: The European Union is currently facing two major conflicts on its borders. One is in the eastern neighborhood with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The other is in the southern neighborhood with the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
The war in Ukraine is a more serious concern because it directly involves Russia’s challenge to European security. As Europe cannot rely anymore on the Trumpian United States for assistance in war and peace in Ukraine, it has to rethink its entire security strategy. This is a very controversial issue and can lead to disagreements and disunity among European states and societies.
Europe is now realizing that it can no longer take US protection for granted. Under Trump, the United States may even become a rival and competitor rather than an ally. This is forcing Europe to think more strategically and to invest in its own defense in ways it has not done before.
As for the Balkans, the region remains volatile and receptive to external influences. Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as instability in Bosnia, could escalate. Russia remains involved in the Balkans, using its influence in Serbia and Hungary to create friction in Europe. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Europe’s influence is limited and mostly related to particular states like France or the United Kingdom. The Eastern Mediterranean for its part is defined by energy and security issues that involve regional actors like Turkey, Israel, Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus with their own national agendas, as well as wider geopolitical power struggles involving the United States, Russia, and China. Europe has little direct influence over events in Gaza or the broader Middle Eastern dynamics.
The key takeaway is that Europe will have to become a geopolitical and defense actor. The era of the European Union as an exclusively purely economic and normative power is over and new geopolitical considerations define its forthcoming identity.
GJIA: My last question is one I asked you three years ago. Given how circumstances have changed, I want to ask again. How important is it for the European Union to develop a more unified foreign policy?
Dr. Anastasakis: The key question has always been whether Europe can speak with one voice on foreign policy. That is not always very easy to achieve.
The biggest challenge for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is that it requires unanimous agreement among member states. Traditionally, the European Union has found it easier to present a united front on issues that are further afield, such as conflicts in Africa, Latin America, or Asia. However, when it comes to crises within its neighborhood, involving Russia or Israel-Palestine, divisions emerge. These crises tend to be more sensitive as EU member states have differing national interests, historical ties, and strategic priorities in their immediate vicinity.
The European Union often settles for a lowest common denominator approach, finding just enough consensus to present a shared position often at the expense of bold, decisive action. The biggest imminent challenge is the transatlantic rift. If the United States under Trump moves closer to Russia, Europe will have to decide on how to strengthen its own resilience in response. The United Kingdom is already moving closer to its European partners despite Brexit, recognizing the urgency of European security concerns.
Europe’s foreign policy decisions are the outcome of states’ internal and external considerations, and as such, they are not always uniform. Facing imminent threats, however, like the current circumstances from Putin’s Russia and Trump’s United States, force the European Union to consider acting as a more united actor. Whether this can become a reality is a more uncertain prospect.
GJIA: Thank you. I really appreciate your time.
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Dr. Othon Anastasakis is a Senior Research Fellow at St Antony’s College and the Director of both the European Studies Centre and South East European Studies at Oxford. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies where he teaches South East European politics. He is also the Principal Investigator of research projects, including “The Greek Diaspora Project,” “The Eastern Mediterranean Programme,” and “Migration Diplomacy: EU-Turkey Relations.” His research interests encompass Balkan comparative politics, transition and democratization, Greek foreign policy, Greek-Turkish relations, and broader issues of European geopolitics, migration, and diaspora studies.
This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity and length.
Interview conducted by Spyridon Spyromilios
Image Credit: Taxiarchos228, FAL, via Wikimedia Commons.
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