GJIA: What were some of the top priorities for Mozambican voters heading into this election?
Emilia Columbo: Two priorities were personal security and the economy. Mozambique has been grappling with the problem of kidnapping for ransom. These kidnappings have mostly plagued the business community, but they still create a sense of insecurity and foster the impression that the police may be complicit. We also need greater attention to economic development and opportunities for youth, such as support for youth entrepreneurship. In Mozambique, the youth account for more than half of the population, and many struggle to attain economic opportunities. Given the size of the youth vote and scarcity of opportunities, the economy was certainly a “hot button” issue.
GJIA: How did political parties appeal to voters on these issues, and how did their platforms differ?
EC: The parties differed in their focus and approach. For example, Venâncio Mondlane, the presidential candidate of PODEMOS (Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique), focused on economic distribution. He argued that individuals should benefit from the sale of raw materials from different regions of the country. For example, if you live in an area with a forestry-based economy, you should get some rent from the forestry industry. The money should not all go to the capital, Maputo, and then disappear. Mondlane was very emphatic about giving back profits to provinces, which I think resonated with the people. In contrast, RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) focused more on agricultural development. This party promised to increase investment in agriculture as an engine of growth, claiming it would industrialize the industry.
The solution to security problems also diverged. While parties discussed security issues in Cabo Delgado, a province in the northern part of the country, their messages varied. Some opposition candidates advocated for negotiations with the local insurgents. Meanwhile, the government maintained its military approach, despite the challenges it has experienced in implementing this policy. These efforts tended to put aside the fundamental grievances driving the insurgency. Although the introduction of Rwandan and SADC (Southern African Development Community) forces in 2021 helped boost this military push, a long-term solution to the conflict will require a more balanced and multifaceted solution.
GJIA: According to the election results, PODEMOS, a relatively new political party, received the second-highest vote share. How do you account for the rise of this new party, and how do you think it will influence the political stage in the upcoming years?
EC: PODEMOS is interesting because it broke away from FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) over a dispute about the mayorship candidate in Maputo in 2018. There was a prominent FRELIMO member, Samora Machel Jr., who was not on the party list but wanted to run for the mayorship. Backed by a civil society group, he broke with the party and launched an independent campaign. Although he lost the mayoral election, his supporters encouraged him to run for president. Instead, Machel Jr. rejoined FRELIMO. However, his supporters decided to strike out on their own, protesting the anti-democratic process of selecting candidates within the FRELIMO party bureaucracy and advocating for the better distribution of economic rents.
In the 2024 presidential election, PODEMOS allied itself with Mondlane, a charismatic speaker who had broken away from RENAMO, historically the main opposition party to FRELIMO. Frustrated by RENAMO’s lack of strong support, Mondlane joined forces with PODEMOS. Both he and Machel Jr. broke with the major parties over issues that resonate with Mozambican citizens, such as anti-democratic tendencies and the hoarding of the country’s wealth. PODEMOS also made very effective use of social media. Its alliance with Mondlane helped elevate PODEMOS’s profile, especially among the large segment of frustrated youth.
GJIA: FRELIMO has maintained power since Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975. This was the first election where they nominated a presidential candidate born after independence. Do you think this generational difference will impact how FRELIMO governs, and did this generational gap inhibit Chapo during the elections?
EC: Daniel Chapo won the nomination through a long series of negotiations within the party, with uncertainties as to who in the party supports him, how much political independence he has, and whether he can shake things up within the party and the country. One thing FRELIMO deserves credit for is its consistent respect for term limits and its tradition of introducing new leadership. Typically, a new president brings some policy shifts, but this time, the party emerged fractured from the nomination process. So Chapo—who is fairly new to politics, having had only a governorship and some political experience in the north—is dealing with a divided party. Given the state of the party and his convoluted path to the nomination, we don’t know what Chapo would change and what power he has to make changes. He is only 48 years old and is no one’s favorite candidate. I would argue that Chapo’s age had less impact on his previous campaign and his ability to govern than these other internal political factors.
GJIA: The PODEMOS party has alleged that FRELIMO’s victory is due to fraud and that FRELIMO is inhibiting the rightful transfer of government leadership to them. Is this election outcome markedly different from prior elections?
EC: I do not think that this election signals democratic backsliding. Every election in Mozambican history has been marred by allegations of fraud, and a number of allegations targeted Chapo for using state resources to fund his campaign. FRELIMO has controlled the government for 50 years and has significant influence over the media and civil society. If you look at Chapo’s campaign events, everyone is wearing FRELIMO T-shirts, and there is a dais with lots of pomp and circumstance. The other parties’ rallies were simply held on the pavement with a sign, but no large spectacle. Walls in Maputo were covered with FRELIMO posters and huge electronic displays for advertisements promoting Chapo’s candidacy. None of the other candidates had those capabilities. Right out of the gate, the opposition parties were at a disadvantage.
FRELIMO also engages in illicit activities such as ballot-box stuffing and appointing party allies to positions of power in voting stations to manipulate the vote count. This behavior has historically plagued Mozambican elections, so its continuation was not a significant departure from prior elections. What is different about this election is how people are reacting to these illicit activities.
PODEMOS updated their supporters as the results were being released. They disseminated information via social media, keeping tallies of districts where they won. Since they were tracking the electoral results, the party was furious when the final count came out. They called out the results as fraudulent and urged supporters to resist. And people did. There have always been levels of post-election protest and violence in Mozambique, but not a sustained cross-country response with military deployment and internet severance. In other words, fraud is to be expected, but the post-election response this time was much more severe. PODEMOS and Mondlane inspired many Mozambicans.
GJIA: How have these protests impacted Mozambique’s image in the international community, and how has the international community responded to this unrest?
EC: The scale and duration of these protests are unprecedented. I have seen reports of protests in Germany, Brazil, Portugal, and Angola, which were organized by the global Mozambican diaspora community in solidarity with the pro-PODEMOS protestors. People are no longer tolerating fraudulent elections. By drawing international attention to the election and creating economic disruptions both within and outside of Mozambique, these protests have certainly diminished Mozambique’s national image and disincentivized foreign investment. However, the international community’s response thus far has been passive. Several countries and organizations, such as the European Union, have published statements calling for the de-escalation of violence and demanding that the government respect democratic norms, but there has been minimal follow-up.
GJIA: What are the main short and long-term economic consequences of the post-election protests?
EC: The economic impacts of the protests are already apparent. The Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique estimated that the first few days of protests generated an estimated $45 million in economic losses, including the destruction of property and looting. Furthermore, South Africa closed its border with Mozambique soon after the protests began, resulting in cross-border transportation delays. These statistics demonstrate the significant impact of the protests on Mozambique’s daily economic activities.
I think one of the long-term consequences of the protests will be reputational. Over the past few years, the government has made a concerted effort to improve its international reputation and attract foreign investment. These efforts came in the wake of the infamous tuna-bond corruption scandal and the escalation of the Cabo Delgado conflict, both of which conveyed the image that Mozambique was unsafe for investment. In fact, the French petroleum company Totale ceased its liquefied natural gas exploration due to the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The withdrawal of Totale and other corporations and the continued hesitancy among many foreign corporations to invest in Mozambique have certainly hurt the Mozambican economy. After FRELIMO spent years attempting to repair Mozambique’s global image, the post-electoral protests signal a reputational setback that may further disincentivize foreign investment.
GJIA: What role should states and international institutions play in addressing the allegations of fraud and helping Maputo rebuild after all these protests?
EC: There were many international observers at this election. The European Union, African Union, Southern African Development Community, International Republican Institute, and several other organizations sent delegations to monitor the process, and all published reports acknowledging irregularities in the electoral process. Now, states and organizations must determine the most effective way to exert their influence, as the Mozambican government does not take kindly to pressure from outside forces. Successful action by the international community necessitates collaboration with Mozambican stakeholders, which would reduce negative backlash from FRELIMO.
GJIA: In your article, you argue that PODEMOS’s success may “present an opportunity for partners to push for greater political opening and changes to the electoral process.” How much progress do you foresee PODEMOS achieving when FRELIMO still has a significant government majority?
EC: When I wrote that article, the official results were not finalized. Observers were still concerned that FRELIMO would attempt to preserve the political status quo by manipulating the results in RENAMO’s favor. The fact that FRELIMO is letting PODEMOS lead the opposition indicates incremental progress.
PODEMOS is already making its mark on Mozambican politics. The protests have attracted immediate international attention and suggest that the party will not passively abide by FRELIMO’s demands. PODEMOS has an opportunity to truly change the political landscape in Mozambique and mount a challenge to the ruling party.
…
Emilia Columbo is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a senior analyst at VoxCroft Analytics. Prior to these positions, she served as a senior analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, where she covered political and security issues in Africa and Latin America. Ms. Columbo speaks professional-level Spanish and Portuguese. She holds a Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University and a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of California, Santa Barbara.
This article has been lightly edited for clarity and length.
Interview conducted by Sydney Pappas and Sharon Xie.
Image Credit: DNE Africa.
