Georgetown Journal of International Affairs: Tonga’s unique political system combines traditional monarchy with modern democracy. How has this structure affected Tonga’s governance and ability to respond to modern challenges?
Tevita Motulalo: It is fairly simple I would say, as a monarchy born out of the traditional chiefly system, but Tonga’s political structure has and continues to be very sensitive to global power changes. We adopted the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy in 1875, similar to many Commonwealth countries, but Tui Tonga socio-political control has existed for over a thousand years, covering vast swathes of the Pacific. By the turn of the 19th century, Tonga signed a protectorate treaty with the United Kingdom through which they controlled foreign affairs and defense on our behalf, only coming to an end in 1970.
By the early 2000s, there was a major movement for greater democracy and accountability, which became increasingly violent around 2006, with a movement that demanded the monarchy be abolished completely. As a result of that, we have taken large strides in terms of constitutional reforms, but a lot of details, such as where institutions overlap, still have to be ironed out. Our King is still the head of state, but how active he should be relative to the Prime Minister, is still unclear. The King still has the power to define foreign policy, appointing ambassadors and ministers, so in a way he is in charge of a lot of state responsibilities as a checking mechanism. Our Prime Minister resigned in December in part due to this, breaking protocols by opposing the King’s decisions on foreign affairs. Amongst many other scandals, such as leaked private attacks on Australia and New Zealand, as well as a bribery allegation related to the national airline, the Prime Minister had apparently lost royal favor and could have failed a vote of no confidence as a result.
GJIA: The Prime Minister’s resignation brought to light how corruption can be a significant concern in Tonga, with risks of foreign influence. What does this look like on the ground, and have any policies been proposed to improve accountability?
TM: With small countries come not only small economies, but also small governments. In places like Tonga, that looks like entire ministries with as few as ten to fifteen people. The ability of such a small group to wield so much responsibility means their resistance to corruption becomes much more complicated.
We need governance to progress laterally, with support institutions that can effectively check and balance the risk of corrupt actions. Institutions like anti-corruption commissioners and an ombudsman’s office are often not present because of how small our government is. Accountability therefore means not only footwork in the ‘big G’ definition of government, but also the ‘small g’ of local institutions.
Regarding foreign presence, where do you draw the line in terms of involvement? Tonga recently announced its first anti-corruption comissioner, funded in part by Australia. But when you open the door to foreign presence, what guarantees that China is not going to fund one as well? It is a tricky situation, and where the risk of foreign infuence plays out more than direct corruption.
GJIA: With the Pacific Islands Forum meeting recently in Tonga, how do Tonga’s regional relationships shape its response to regional issues?
TM: I would say Tonga has been lucky as we outperform a lot of our neighbors on issues like education, women’s rights, mortality, and medicine. Tongans have also been very influential in regional institutions, as one of the main sponsors of the creation of the Pacific Islands Forum. Geographically, Tonga is very close with Samoa and Fiji, and the Tongan identity is an amalgamotion of a lot of regional powers. Our monarchy is officially titled ‘a King from Upolu,’ which is in fact in Samoa, and probably half or more of the chiefly titles here are actually from a Fijian origin.
Our region has historically been relatively peaceful, partly due to its location; I often call it ‘paradise in isolation.’ This is also why when it comes to the issues we face in the Pacific, we are hit hard. We now sit at the unfortunate crossroads of several global ones: climate change, transnational crime, the flow of drugs, and of course the wrestling of geopolitical forces for influence. The challenges affect us more than others because we are right in the middle of them. People mention globalization and the global economy—the global economy runs through the Pacific. I think around sixty percent of all seaborne trade takes place in our region. This is why I find it distracting to say that a country is ‘pivoting to the Pacific’—the Pacific itself is the pivot. We are the vantage point from which one can project their force most effectively, and why everyone is suddenly rushing to get a stake in the region to better control their own levers, including in Tonga.
GJIA: Do you think Pacific countries can integrate further to capitalize on this?
TM: As much as I would like to see it, the high cost of mobility in the Pacific holds back a lot of cohesive action and integration. We are grappling with a fundamental transportation problem. Our economies cannot work together as much as we would like because of just how spread out and isolated the region is. However, we have a lot of global partners we can learn from to counter this though: Israel and Singapore are good examples of small islands in a sea of challenges.
I prefer to imagine the Pacific as one continent—the ‘blue continent.’ Instead of one landmass, our islands are city states. Together, this would be the largest nation-state on the planet. The question is, how do you leverage it and capitalize on development without just living on handouts? One of the arguments for the Prime Minister’s resignation was the sheer number of handouts. After the tsunami we had, there was this dumping of finance that was not effectively utilized by the government. There are surpluses in some areas, and shortages in the other, with a failing private sector. We cannot scale up regionally and integrate without first resolving these kinds of local challenges.
GJIA: Significant financing in the Pacific takes the form of external debt, particularly to China. Is there a strategy to balance these financial obligations while maintaining sovereignty?
TM: In Tonga, we always say ‘we can balance it,’ but China sees it differently. Why call in the debt? It is too small of an amount relative to them, and it acts like a leash they could eventually pull on—one they would not like to give up. It creates a psychological relationship with governments in the region. We can service it with our current GDP, and local companies have actually volunteered to contribute, but the government has said it is better to leave it be because China is not eager to call it in any time soon.
There is, however, the real possibility of a future conflict in the region, perhaps with Taiwan, which is when it is likelier to pose a problem. It will be dramatically different to service the debt then, and China could use that to their advantage. It is not a good idea to walk around with a rope around your neck this way, but China is happy to abide by the small interest repayment per year and use it to their advantage.
GJIA: China has become a major force in the region, but traditionally that role has been occupied by Australia. What does that geopolitical relationship look like, and how is Australia viewed?
TM: It is a complicated dynamic. On one hand, we must live with our closest major neighbor, but problems keep arising due to unmitigated Australian interventionism, that in turn open up the door for China. I mentioned Canberra finances our anti-corruption commissioner in Tonga, but say domestic troubles arise and they cannot uphold the commitment? China usually waits for the second turn, because the first often falls through, and they fill the gap. Look at the case of the Solomon Islands. In the 2000s, an Australian intervention force was sent to keep the peace due to upheaval, and by the end of it, there was a lot more dissatisfaction for the mission from the locals who saw it as Australian arrogance. As a result, China now holds a lot of influence, politically and economically, in the Solomon Islands. China recently proposed a regional security group for the Pacific for countries to sign up to, and so far, many have not, in part because Australia, the traditional guarantor, is considering offering a similar kind of security cooperation program. I can hope they stay committed to it and let the Pacific Islands have a say, but history hasn’t always been too positive.
GJIA: Looking ahead, what is your vision for Tonga and the Pacific’s political and social future? How can future leadership ensure the country’s sustainable development and balance growing international attention?
TM: It is a matter of stock taking. The Pacific needs to come to terms with its geopolitical value and leverage it carefully. As I said earlier, a lot of our countries are related, and we do not have to construct any new identities but instead look back and realize that most of our people share interconnected origins. Moreover, the digital age is synonymous with the satellite age, and a lot of Pacific countries are in a unique place to leverage that due to our optimal locations for space launches and observations.
We have had this needed foresight before. In the 1990s, Tonga already had a company dealing in geosynchronous orbits, holding almost one tenth of the global slots. If we invest heavily in upcoming technologies, there is a great deal of potential. This is where have to look in terms of selling the ‘Pacific identity’—we have more value to the global system than we do to ourselves. Opening up the region to engagement with a wider range of partners, and not influence-seekers, is the first step. We already have a lot of synergy with Southeast Asian countries, as well as India, Taiwan, and Japan, and we need to leverage these ties with them. I think the world is ready for the Pacific to take on a new presence—we just have to rise up to meet it.
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Tevita Motulalo is a geopolitics scholar and analyst from Tonga with a MSc in Geopolitics and International Relations from Manipal University, India. He was 2015 Next Gen Security Scholar at the Pacific Island Society and the founding Research Director of the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga. He is now the founder and director of the Moana Institute of Strategic Affairs (MISA), covering strategic issues of direct global influence in the Pacific Islands and the regional dynamics of the Pacific and Indo-Pacific region. Mr. Motulalo is also currently a lecturer for media and journalism at the Tonga National University, and is an advocate of media freedom among the communities of the Pacific Islands.
This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity and length.
Interview conducted by Sid Mehrotra.
Image Credit: Vernon Raineil Cenzon, Unsplash Content License, via Unsplash.
