GJIA: What is your assessment of the coming future of US-China competition under the second Trump administration?
AW: US-China competition will be different from what we have seen under the Biden administration, but also different from Trump’s first term. There are two possible directions this would take. To begin, it is pretty clear that we are looking at a more structured form of intense competition between the two sides. It will be interesting to see whether the second Trump administration wants to use trade issues to strike some grand bargain with China in the first part of the administration. It is probably wrong to say that any Trump administration would be incapable of moving along those lines. Some ideas have been circulating about a reasonably straightforward approach to tariffs that would both give the Trump administration some of what they are looking for and give China some level of predictability in terms of bilateral U.S.-China trade and investment. There will possibly also be discussions on technology issues.
The other possibility is that the situation gets out of hand, resulting in a full-fledged tariff war that feeds into other issues, like security concerns in East Asia. It is also possible, as some commentators have pointed out, that it would be the other way around. Some immediate security issues within the region—Taiwan, Korea, the South China Sea, and possibly also China’s relationship with Russia regarding Ukraine—could become so intense that they would impact bilateral U.S.-China relations. The overall security situation in East Asia does not make bilateral US-China relations an easy issue.
GJIA: You’ve argued that the American public and government often misunderstand Chinese decision-making under Xi Jinping. What should Americans know about how politics really work in Beijing?
AW: The big challenge is that politics in Beijing have changed quite a bit over the past decade. First, Chinese politics have become much more centralized and oriented towards a small leadership group with Xi Jinping at the helm. Decision-making on key foreign affairs issues now goes straight to the top, via the various foreign affairs-oriented parts of the Chinese Communist Party. The role of the PRC’s Foreign Ministry has frankly never been comparable to the role the State Department plays in U.S. foreign policy making. But with China’s increasing emphasis on party structures over state structures under Xi Jinping, the role of the Foreign Ministry has been further reduced. The same can be said for the military. Everything now goes through the Party or its top organs and the leader himself.
Secondly, regarding ideology, Xi stands firmly behind China’s central preeminence in East Asia, and the centralization of power within China under the Communist Party. These two trends were underway even before Xi came to power. Those who installed him responded to what they saw as real issues for China’s development—corruption, decentralization, and the influence of big companies and foreign entities. There was a great deal of consensus on centralizing power within the higher echelons of the Communist Party in the early 2010s. Xi, however, has taken it further, and that is the big policy question for China now: how much more centralization and economic development away from the reform and opening-up era can China take before there are significant domestic difficulties? We are already seeing some. So, it is quite possible—and this is an important point for the new administration—that many of China’s most significant challenges over the next decade will not stem from foreign affairs but from domestic issues. They are tied to the development of the Chinese economy and social system, as well as growing dissatisfaction, particularly among younger generations. As the economy continues to falter, many young Chinese are increasingly frustrated, feeling they have no outlet for their disenchantment or address their concerns about the future. That is a strong cocktail of grievances, and the Chinese Communist Party’s response will be decisive for the nation’s future.
GJIA: In your essay “Sleepwalking Toward War” in Foreign Affairs, you draw a comparison between U.S.-China competition today and the great power relationship between the United Kingdom and Germany in the lead-up to World War One. Tell us about the historical precedents that you see for the modern great power relationship. Are we, in fact, destined for conflict?
AW: This is, undoubtedly, the big question. The prevailing narrative in both Washington and Beijing draws parallels between the current situation and the Cold War. I find this misleading. While certain aspects of our current situation are remnants of the Cold War, the structural reality today is far different from that of the past.
It does, unfortunately, remind me of the tension in the first decade of the 20th century. That was a period marked by rapid globalization and the expansion of an international, mainly trade-based economy, which came increasingly under pressure from countries and people who felt they lacked a fair deal in that global order. This discontent also arose within major countries, most notably in Britain—a situation that parallels the dynamics in the United States today. In the early 20th century, a lot of Britons wondered whether Britain, the country that invented free trade, was still benefiting enough from the globalization that the world had gone through in the late 19th century. Many then turned towards imposing tariffs to limit the openness of the economy.
Simultaneously, there was the rise of Germany, which, following its unification in 1871, bears striking parallels to the rise of China today. It marked the emergence of a large and rapidly developing country at the heart of the world’s most critical region—Europe then, East Asia now. Germany’s economic growth over a short period was remarkable, driven by a leadership class deeply fixated on securing a dominant position within continental Europe. This included exerting influence over neighboring countries, even major powers like France and Russia. Germany then allied itself with its closest imperial neighbor—Austria-Hungary—which seems to have much in common with Russia today: a vast, composite empire in decline, quarreling with almost all its neighbors, and a security need increasingly connected to the emerging power. In many ways, that is a perfect resemblance to the Sino-Russian relationship today, adding the advancement in military technology that makes the world more uncertain, incipient arms races, and greater emphasis on ideological divergence. In Britain, the division between it and Germany was seen as one between democracy and authoritarianism, which was wildly overblown at the time, since Germany was not much less democratic than Britain was in terms of political institutions and participation.
These concerning parallels demand more of our attention. As we know, 1914 marked a catastrophic turning point, and today I see approaches to international affairs—particularly the recent resurgence of nationalism and even racism on a global scale—that strongly evoke the dynamics of the pre-1914 period.
GJIA: Your book, The Cold War: a World History, explains the global ideological battle at the core of that superpower competition. How are the US and China competing for ideological influence in the global south today?
AW: Unlike the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was confined in the Comecon system and sought to replace the international order with a global communist form of union, the United States and China today exist within the same global economic framework. There are similarities in that countries in the Global South now have at least two distinct options for economic assistance, trade, and development—a dynamic that did not exist immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China has, to some extent, replaced the role of the Soviet Union as the other pole for these countries.
Now, it is also significantly different from the Cold War in terms of how countries in the Global South navigate these options. We have seen, particularly after the start of the Ukraine crisis, that the world is not becoming more bipolar. The United States and China are the most significant great powers, but that does not mean that other countries, including those that have developed various degrees of close relationships with both countries for economic reasons, will have to abide by the demands of the United States or China. This is particularly the case for the larger countries in the Global South, which are taking their own positions concerning international affairs and maintaining independent relationships with the United States and China. That is why I argue that the world will be increasingly multipolar, with the United States and China being most influential while other powers emerge relatively quickly. Consider India, for instance. There is little to suggest that either China or the United States will be able to dictate its foreign policy positions. China is not even able to get its way concerning much of what is happening with its closest pseudo-ally, Russia. The United States has much less leeway in determining what happens in Europe than it did during the Cold War. So, one has to be very careful with these parallels, even though there are some possible comparisons and holdovers from the Cold War.
GJIA: Finally, another aspect of your work has focused on what you call power shifts in global history. Where does the current moment fall with respect to this framework? Are we in the midst of a power shift now?
AW: We are indeed in a power shift—not from the United States to China, but rather from a unipolar world with the United States at the center to a much more multipolar framework. It will take some time for that framework to come into being, but the direction is evident. Great powers will orient themselves primarily with regard to their own regions, with the United States and possibly China as the only ones who will—at least for a time—deem themselves to have overarching global interests.
This brings both hopes and challenges for the future. The hope is that in a multipolar world—messy and sometimes chaotic as it may be—it will be possible to establish a framework through negotiations and relationships akin to that of the 19th century, a balance of power among nations, potentially grounded in their respective regional influences. The challenge—the truly alarming aspect—is that this inherent messiness makes it far more difficult to manage crises, such as those that ultimately led to war in 1914. It is much more difficult to determine the course of action on both sides over any given crisis. Many people forget that the crisis in 1914 escalated into a catastrophe in less than a month. The leaderships of various powers, driven by fear of what others might do, acted defensively to maximize their own security. Thus, the war came. As we move toward a more multipolar world, it is crucial to remain vigilant against the kind of existential fear that consumed nations in 1914. We have to ensure that when we see regional or global crises, we prioritize negotiation and dialogue to navigate a path out of conflict.
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Odd Arne Westad is Elihu Professor of History at Yale University, where he also teaches in the Jackson School of Global Affairs (currently on leave for the Spring 2025 Semester). A specialist in international history and China, he previously taught, among others, at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He holds a PhD in history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and a bachelor’s degree from the University of Oslo in his native Norway. He is the author of le books, including The Cold War: a World History, and his work has also been published in Foreign Affairs.
This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity and length.
Interview conducted by Owen Huang and Harry Yang.
Image Credit: Henry Chen, Unsplash, Via Unsplash Content License
